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A number of problems in physics, mathematics, and philosophy involve observers in given situa-
tions which lead to debates about whether observer-specific information should affect the probability
for some outcome or hypothesis. Our purpose is not to advocate for such observer selection effects,
rather to show that any such effects depend greatly on the assumptions made. We focus on the de-
bate about the existence of a ‘Doomsday effect’—whether observer index information should cause
one to favor possibilities with fewer observers, which has been argued to have implications for mod-
els of cosmology. Our central goal is to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies in the literature by
introducing a formalism to lay bare assumptions made and address a key issue that has been glossed
over in such problems: whether the observer is selected by picking from or being in a set of worlds.
In the former there generally are observer selection effects, in the latter there generally are not.
This leads us to differentiate what we call inclusive from exclusive selection, and how they relate
to the concept of a multiverse. Then we relax the assumption that all observers are equally typical,
and consider the problem of Boltzmann brains, showing that typicality can play a role in solving
the problem. We then stress the need for scale-invariant questions, which causes us to analyze J.
Richard Gott’s approach to the problem. This all allows us to analyze the Doomsday and Universal
Doomsday arguments. We find that there is no Doomsday effect, absent a set of assumptions we
find somewhat unreasonable. Then we use our formalism to resolve a debate in the philosophy
community called the ‘Sleeping Beauty Problem.’ Finally, we conclude with a heuristic summary,
free from equations, and point to possible future directions of this line of research.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physicists usually shun observer-specific information,
and for good reason. Our theories are based on invari-
ances, such as those with respect to space and time,
and should not depend on who is testing them. Emmy
Noether showed that conservation laws are rooted in sym-
metries [1]. Yet we accept boundary conditions and sym-
metry breaking because of the constraints of the real
world. And sometimes just being an observer can bias
our viewpoint. It took millennia for humans to realize
that we were not the center of the Universe and that
we are atypical collections of matter in being confined
to the surface of a habitable planet. Some of the ap-
parent coincidences which seem necessary for life to have
evolved may be due to generalizing this notion of us be-
ing atypical [2, 3]. But our purpose here is to focus on
one particular type of observer effect: that probabilities
we assign to the selection of an entity may differ if the
entity is an observer because the observer has the capac-
ity to self-select. We will see that changing assumptions
can completely change these effects, so, at a minimum,
anyone invoking them, or decrying them, should carefully
lay out all assumptions made.
The quintessential example is the ‘Doomsday argu-
ment’ [4], about which there is much debate [5–11]. Sup-
pose you assign some prior probability p for case S, that
the ‘world’ of which you are a part (and we will define
‘world’ in various ways) will persist only for a short time,
with a relatively small number of ‘people’ ever living in
that world. The other possibility, L, is that it will per-
sist longer, with more total ‘people,’ to which you assign
probability 1− p. But you realize that in your guess for
p, you have neglected to take into account any possible
observer selection effects (OSEs). The Doomsday argu-
ment says that you should adjust p upwards because the
probability is small that you would just happen to live
very, very early in the life of a world, and thus you are
more likely to live in a short-lived world for which you
would be more typical. Is that right? It depends on your
assumptions.
Throughout most of the paper, we will be talking about
probabilistic situations where there is a set P of ‘people’
(entities capable of being observers, though not always
the primary observer in the situation) from which one
is selected, and we want to know the probability that
the ‘person’ belongs to a subset of P associated with
some property, e.g. “born before the year 2100.” A key
question is whether the ‘person’ self-selects directly from
set P (which is generally embedded in enclosing sets such
as worlds), which we call a ‘Be-selection’ (a Be for short),
or whether they are selected in some other way, which
we call a ‘Pick-selection’ (a Pick for short). In most of
our scenarios, the latter entails more than one selection
because in order to pick an element of set P one must
generally first pick an element of one of the sets that
encloses P (e.g., to pick a nut from a set of jars, one must
first pick one of the jars). The posterior probabilities for
Be and Pick selection differ: OSEs tend to arise in the
latter but not the former.
Philosopher Nick Bostrom has written much about the
Doomsday argument [6, 7, 9]. He too discusses two possi-
ble ways an observer could be selected, often using prob-
lems of prisoners, which make good toy models because
they entail observers confined to specific enclosing sets
(cells in cellblocks in prisons). We will assume through
most of the paper what he calls the Self-Sampling As-
sumption (SSA), which just means that you assume you
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2are equally likely to be any member of the set of pos-
sible observers you define in your problem, i.e., it is an
assumption of typicality. He also considers something
called the Self-Indication Assumption (SIA), which says
you should weight the probability of your existence by
the number of people in the world in which you exist
[5, 8, 12]. This is essentially a kludge factor, and why it
has rightly been found to be problematic [9, 11, 12, 15].
In fact, the SIA gives the wrong answer whenever there
is a selection from an enclosing set, such as in the War-
den problem we discuss in Section III, or when we take
theories to be mutually exclusive, as in Section VI. Nev-
ertheless, we will see that the weighting factor associated
with the SIA appears naturally with the SSA if we as-
sume observers are Be-selected rather than Pick-selected.
So there are conflicting and problematic results and
apparent misunderstandings in the literature, and much
of this is due to there being no universal notation. Our
goal in writing this paper is to resolve these issues. Cen-
tral to doing so is our novel nested-set notation, which
we hope will allow authors to make clear their assump-
tions on how observers are selected, so readers can judge
for themselves if the assumptions made, and the results
they lead to, are reasonable.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next two
sections, we consider the selection of observers within
‘worlds’ (prisoners in cellblocks), first via a Be-selection,
and then via a Pick-selection, showing how OSEs arise
in the latter. In the following two sections, we discuss
what happens if we embed the worlds in an enclosing set
E, and there is just one Be-selection on P (an inclusive
selection), or an additional Pick on set E (an exclusive
selection), again with OSEs in the latter. If we take set E
to comprise ‘everything’ then we term the inclusive case
the inclusiverse and the exclusive case an exclusiverse.
The key difference between them is that in the former
we assume that all hypothesized things exist, and in the
latter we do not. This leads to a general principle: it is
effects of the latter which lead to OSEs. Later we dis-
cuss whether it is possible to distinguish these two cases,
and relate them to the term ‘multiverse’, but our purpose
is to lay out how to calculate probabilities given certain
assumptions, not to posit the nature of reality. Next
we discuss spaces of theories, typicality, and the issue of
‘freak’ observers in cosmology called Boltzmann brains
and how our analysis can frame that problem. Then we
consider an analysis by J. Richard Gott [13], which lets
us phrase the Doomsday argument in a scale-invariant
way. We are then ready to fully address the Doomsday
argument, and what has been called ‘Universal Dooms-
day.’ We show that while many sets of assumptions lead
to no Doomsday effect, it is possible to come up with
a set of assumptions, however implausible, which leads
to one. Then we address a related problem in philoso-
phy called the ‘Sleeping Beauty Problem.’ Finally, we
summarize our results and point to future directions.
In an effort to make the paper readable to the wider
world, the summary is comprehensive of our results with-
out equations. We have also put details of our nested-set
notation into Appendix A. And in the body of the pa-
per, we spell out many intermediate steps in our equa-
tions since some interested in the results here may include
those less familiar with working out such steps.
II. TO BE: PRISONER PROBLEM
Imagine you are a prisoner and have the following in-
formation: The prison you are in has two types of cell-
blocks, small (S) and large (L), which contain n¯S and
n¯L cells per cellblock respectively. You want to estimate
the probability that you are in an S cellblock.
Before we dive into a lot of notation, let us consider
a simple numerical example, where there is one cellblock
of each type, with n¯S = 2 and n¯L = 6 (see the left side
of Fig. 1). You do not know your cell number at the
outset, so you could be in either the S or L cellblock.
Now, you look at your door and learn your cell number.
If it is greater than 2, you know you are in the L cellblock.
Let’s assume that it is cell number 2, so you could be in
either cellblock. What is the probability that you are in
the S cellblock? Well, there are exactly two cells with
cell number 2, one in each cellblock. And you have no
reason to favor one over the other, so you should assign a
probability of 1/2 for being in the S cellblock. Note that
this is equal to the probability of picking the S cellblock
at random. In other words, the posterior probability for
being in cellblock S, given the cell-number datum that
you could be in either cellblock, is the same as the prior
probability of randomly picking cellblock S—there is no
observer selection effect.
Now, let us formalize the problem for a general number
of prisoners and cellblocks. You assign labels NS and
NL to the number of cellblocks of each type, but all you
know is that there is at least one cellblock (since you are
in one), i.e., N ≡ NS + NL ≥ 1. You also know that
the prison is full and that each prisoner was assigned a
random cell in the prison, with exactly one prisoner per
cell. Let the ratio of cells in L and S cellblocks be
ρ ≡ n¯L/n¯S , (1)
which is by assumption greater than 1. The bar just
indicates we have normalized to the number of cellblocks.
The total number of prisoners in all cellblocks of type
J = S or L is nJ , which is equal to the number of cells
per cellblock of that type times the number of cellblocks
of that type:
nJ = n¯JNJ . (2)
Let us call the set of prisoners P (for ‘person,’ the set
that will usually hold our observers), and the set of cell-
blocks W (for ‘world,’ since this problem is an analogue
3to one of observers in worlds). WS and WL are the sub-
sets of W containing all S and L cellblocks, respectively.
Since there are only two types of cellblocks, the set W
is the union of them: W = WS ∪WL. You assign some
prior probability for what the fraction of small cellblocks
P (WS) = NS/N might be (we assume that the proba-
bility of picking any given cellblock is simply 1/N , and
these P (WS) and P (WL) are fixed inputs—we will ex-
plore varying ratios of them in Section IV). Note that P
is nested within W , i.e., every element of P (a prisoner)
is associated with a particular element of W (a cellblock).
The compound set PWS contains the set of S cellblocks,
and the set of prisoners in P who are in S cellblocks (see
Appendix A for details on notation).
We will assume the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA)
[7],
SSA: One should reason as if one is a random
sample from the set of all observers in ones
reference class.
This is simply assuming typicality, that the probability
of you being in a subset of a larger set is simply equal
to the fraction of observers of the reference class (which
we call set P ) who are in that subset. For example, the
probability to Be in subset Px of set P is just P (Px|P ) =
nx/n.
You learn one datum, your cell number. Divide the
datum into two categories: d if your cell number is ≤ n¯S ,
and ¬d if it is > n¯S . The corresponding subsets of P
are Pd and P¬d (P = Pd ∪ P¬d). If your datum is ¬d,
you know for sure that you are in an L cellblock (because
your cell number is greater than n¯S). The case of interest
is when the datum is d, where you could still be in either
type of cellblock. The question we want to answer in the
Prisoner Problem is,
What is the posterior probability that a pris-
oner is in an S cellblock, given that they
match datum d?
For convenience we define the number of people match-
ing datum d to be m ≡ nd, and the number of peo-
ple matching datum d within a cellblock type J to be
mJ ≡ nd,J , where J = L or S. All observers with cell
numbers ≤ n¯S match datum d, so the number of peo-
ple per cellblock matching datum d is m¯ = n¯S , and this
holds for both S and L cellblocks, so,
m¯ = m¯S = m¯L = n¯S . (3)
We want to calculate the probability of you being in
a cellblock type S (i.e., in subset PWS of PW ) given
the datum, d, that you are in a low cell number (i.e., in
subset PdW of PW ), which we write at the conditional
probability P (PWS |PdW ). We will calculate this using
Bayes’ Law, so we need the likelihood of matching the
datum given that we are in a cellblock type S,
P (PdW |PWS) = mS
nS
=
m¯S
n¯S
= 1, (4)
and the probability [14] to Be in cellblock type S,
P (PWS) =
nS
n
=
n¯SNS
n¯N
=
n¯S
n¯
P (WS), (5)
where P (WS) is the prior probability to Pick a cellblock
of type S (which, assuming random typical selection, is
equal to our prior value for fraction of worlds, NS/N).
We need to pause here because Eq. (5), despite its
simplicity, is the key to most of our results. We have
simply taken the SSA at face value. Since the prisoner
has an equal chance of being in any cell, the probability to
Be in the subset of prisoners in S cellblocks is simply the
fraction of prisoners in such cellblocks, nS/n, which as
we show in Eq. (5) is equal to the prior P (WS) weighted
by the average number of prisoners n¯S per cellblock of
this type.
We should at this point note the competing assump-
tion, the Self-Indication Assumption [7]:
SIA: Given the fact that you exist, you should
(other things equal) favor hypotheses accord-
ing to which many observers exist over hy-
potheses on which few observers exist.
This does giving the weighting factor seen in Eq. (5), but
it is a kludge factor because it gives that factor regardless
of how the observer is selected, which, as we shall see, is
inappropriate whenever the first selection is from a set
that encloses the observer. (Some may take the SIA to
mean that this weighting factor should be applied where
appropriate—not in any situation where you are an ob-
server. If so, then a way to think of our formalism is that
it shows when that weighting factor is appropriate.) In
contrast, we derived the weighting factor in Eq. (5) sim-
ply using typicality (the SSA) and the recognition that
we are selecting the observer directly from set P . The ef-
fect from how the observer is selected is made transparent
by our nested-set notation. There are a number of places
in the literature which simply refer to “P (S)” and let it
equal to the prior probability for picking a world type S,
when to be a prisoner requires P (PWS) with its weight-
ing factor n¯S/n¯. Failing to include this factor leads to
erroneous support for a Doomsday effect.
Here is another way to understand this weighting fac-
tor. If you use the information that you are an observer
in a random cell before also applying datum d, you are
more likely to be in an L cellblock than your prior for
the fraction of L cellblocks would suggest. For example,
if P (WS) = P (WL) = 1/2, there are ρ times as many ob-
servers in L cellblocks as in S cellblocks, and so the prob-
ability of being in a cellblock type L (before knowing d)
is ρ times that of being in a cellblock type S. This factor
of n¯S in Eq. (5) will exactly cancel a factor of 1/n¯S in the
4likelihood Eq. (4). (As we shall see in the next section,
this factor is absent if there is a Pick on the world set
W . We should also note that by our formulation of the
problem we are assuming that the prisoner could be in
both types of cellblocks. We will later consider the cases
where there are mutually exclusive ‘universes’ (Section
V) and hypotheses (Section VI A).)
So the posterior probability of you being in a cellblock
type S given datum d is given by Bayes’ Law,
P (PWS |PdW ) = P (PdW |PWS)P (PWS)
P (PdW )
=
P (PdW |PWS)P (PWS)∑
J P (PdW |PWJ)P (PWJ)
=
m¯S
n¯S
n¯S
n¯ P (WS)∑
J
m¯J
n¯J
n¯J
n¯ P (WJ)
=
m¯S
m¯
P (WS) = P (WS), (6)
where J = S or L,
∑
J m¯JP (WJ) = m¯, and m¯ = m¯S =
m¯L. The righthand side is the prior probability for pick-
ing a cellblock of type S—i.e., the probability before we
have any observer information at all. As we noted be-
fore, the prior here to pick a world type S, P (WS), is
a fixed value NS/N , not updated by the datum. What
is updated is our posterior probability to be in such a
world. (Note that we can also write this more compactly
using the shorthand notation described in Appendix A,
see Eq. (A16).) We can express the fact that there is
no net observer selection effect by comparing the ratio of
probabilities after (RP ) and before (RW ) observer infor-
mation:
RP ≡ P (PWL|PdW )
P (PWS |PdW ) =
P (WL)
P (WS)
RW ≡ P (WL)
P (WS)
, RP/W ≡ RP
RW
= 1. (7)
In the Prisoner Problem, using observer information,
which includes the effect of you being in a small cell-
block, as well as the likelihood of you being in a low-
numbered cell, you obtain the prior probability to Pick
a cellblock type S. In short, in the Prisoner Problem,
when your datum is d, there is no net observer selection
effect (RP/W = 1).
III. TO PICK: URN AND WARDEN PROBLEMS
Now let W be a set of urns, and P a set of ping-pong
balls in them. Each urn contains either a large (n¯L)
or small (n¯S) number of consecutively numbered balls—
defining subsets WL and WS . You pick an urn at random,
and a ball at random from the urn. Before picking the
ball, in fact before you actually picked an urn, you had
a prior probability that the urn you picked is of type
S, P (WS). After seeing the ball, what is the posterior
probability that the urn is type S?, i.e.,
What is the posterior probability that you
pick an S urn and then a random ball in it,
given that the ball you pick matches datum
d?
Again, let us first use a numerical example to build
intuition. Suppose there are two urns, one S, one L,
with n¯S = 2 and n¯L = 6. You pick a random urn, and
then pick a random ball from it (we shall see that this
is the same as the Warden problem on the right side of
Fig. 1). If the ball number is greater than 2, the urn you
picked was the L urn. So let’s assume the same datum
as before, that it is ball number 2, which corresponds to
datum d. Now, before you knew the ball number, there
was an equal chance that you picked the S or L urn.
But once you have datum d, your posterior probability of
having picked the S urn has greatly increased because all
the balls in the S urn match d, whereas that is true only
of 1/3 of the balls in the L urn. In fact, while your prior
for picking the urns was equal, your posterior probability
of picking the S urn is 3 times that of picking the L urn
(3/4 vs. 1/4). Though the setup seems the same as in
Section II, the fact that there was an initial selection of
the urn makes all the difference.
Let us now go into the details. Obviously, if the ball’s
number is > n¯S , you will know that it is an L urn and
that posterior probability is 0. So let’s assume that the
datum d you get is that the ball’s number is ≤ n¯S . It
is tempting to say that the situation is identical to the
Prisoner example, and that we learn nothing about the
urn. After all, both kinds of urns have the same number
of balls with number less than n¯S . But the situation is
different because in order to pick the ball from the urn,
we first had to pick the urn. To denote that selection,
we put a “ |” between sets (see Appendix A for more on
our set notation). So picking any ball from any urn is
P |W , and picking a ball matching datum d from an S
urn is Pd
|WS . Thus what we seek is P (P |WS |Pd |W ),
the probability of picking a ball from an S urn given that
we picked a ball matching datum d.
The probability of matching datum d given the urn is
type S is exactly the same as Eq. (4) because if it is
given that you picked an S urn, the Pick has no effect on
the likelihood, it is ‘neutered’ (see Appendix A) and we
put a slash through the Pick sign to indicate this:
P (Pd
-W |P -WS) = P (PdW |PWS) = mS
nS
=
m¯S
n¯S
= 1,
(8)
and with m¯S = n¯S (grouping all the balls matching da-
tum d together), P (Pd
|W |P |WS) = 1. However, the
probability of picking a ball from an urn of type S is not
the same as Eq. (5) because there is no weighting for the
number of balls. The probability of picking an S urn and
then picking a ball from it is same as the prior probability
for picking an S urn,
P (P |WS) = P (WS). (9)
5Because of this, there is no factor of n¯S in the numera-
tor to balance the 1/n¯S rank factor in the likelihood, so
Bayes’ Law does not just return the prior as it did in the
Be case in Eq. (6):
P (P |WS |Pd |W ) = P (Pd
-W |P -WS)P (P |WS)∑
J P (Pd
-W |P -WJ)P (P |WJ)
=
m¯S
n¯S
P (WS)∑
J
m¯J
n¯J
P (WJ)
=
P (WS)∑
J
n¯S
n¯J
P (WJ)
=
P (WS)
P (WS) +
1
ρP (WL)
. (10)
(Note, for shorthand notation, see Eq. (A17).) For
P (WL)/ρ small, this goes to 1.
The posterior probability for L given d is
P (P |WL|Pd |W ) =
1
ρP (WL)
P (WS) +
1
ρP (WL)
, (11)
which, for equal priors, goes to 1/ρ for P (WL)/ρ small.
As in Section II, the prior here is a fixed input NL/N
that is unchanged by the datum. Our posterior is the
probability of the urn that we picked to be type L. To
see how data can update a multivalued prior with pick
selection, see Sections V and X.
The ratios for P and W become,
RP | ≡
P (P |WL|Pd |W )
P (P |WS |Pd |W ) =
1
ρ
P (WL)
P (WS)
RW ≡ P (WL)
P (WS)
, RP |/W ≡
RP |
RW
=
1
ρ
. (12)
There is thus a very strong selection effect when one has
to first Pick the urn (RP |/W = 1/ρ).
Of course balls are not people, so it is tempting to
think that it is the nature of the elements of set P that
causes the difference with the Prisoner Problem. To
counter that, consider what we call the Warden Problem,
where P is again a set of prisoners in cellblocks W . But
this time, instead of the prisoner just being the observer
within a cellblock, a warden selects a prisoner by first
picking a random cellblock, and then picking a random
prisoner within the cellblock, all without noting which
type of cellblock she has picked. So the question in the
Warden Problem is,
What is the posterior probability that a war-
den picks an S cellblock and then a random
prisoner in it, given that the prisoner they
pick matches datum d?
Then all follows exactly as in the Urn problem, and the
posterior probability we seek is P (P |WS |Pd |W ). The
warden has a prior probability P (WS) for having picked
a cellblock type S, the likelihood that she gets datum
d given that she picked a cellblock type S is one (i.e.,
P (Pd
|W |P |WS) = 1), and by Bayes’ Law, her posterior
probability given datum d is given by Eq. (10), with a
large selection effect, RP |/W = 1/ρ.
The reason the Warden Problem differs from the Pris-
oner Problem is that the warden has to first Pick a cell-
block, whereas the prisoner is there without needing to
be picked by anyone else. See Fig. 1. (It may help your
intuition to imagine n¯L huge, say 2000 so ρ = 1000. The
Prisoner problem is unchanged since if you satisfy d you
are still in cell 1 or 2 of your cellblock, but in the Warden
problem she is certain to pick cell 1 or 2 if she picks the
S cellblock but there is only one chance in 1000 that she
she will do that in the L cellblock.)
We note that if we try to use the SIA in this problem,
we will get the wrong answer. If you are a prisoner and a
warden picks your cell at random after having picked your
cellblock at random, and you learn you match datum d,
you should conclude that you are likely in an S cellblock.
But the SIA would have you weight your prior probability
to be in a given cellblock by the number of cells, as in
Eq. (5), falsely leading you to conclude that there is no
OSE, whereas typicality (the SSA) gives you the correct
unweighted prior of Eq. (9).
FIG. 1. Why the Warden Problem (with a Pick selection)
leads to an OSE and the Prisoner Problem (with a Be selec-
tion) does not: There are two cellblocks, S and L. Prisoners
all simply ask themselves, “Which cellblock am I in?” and
then observe their cell number to answer. There are more
prisoners in the L cellblock to ask the question, which cancels
the rank factor that a smaller faction of prisoners are in the
first two cells in L than in S, so those in cell 2 are equally
likely to be in either cellblock. The warden first must Pick a
cellblock at random, then select a cell at random within that
cellblock. If the selected prisoner is in cell 2, it is more likely
that the warden picked the S than the L cellblock because
the number of prisoners per cellblock did not affect the odds
that she picked that cellblock, and so the rank factor is not
canceled as it was in the Be case.
Just to highlight further, it is the Pick on the nesting
set W that causes a change in the posterior probabil-
ity. Consider the Warden Cafeteria problem, where all
the prisoners are in a cafeteria, and the warden Picks a
prisoner at random. If that prisoner is from a cell num-
ber ≤ n¯S , what is the probability that they came from
an S cellblock? Now the selection is directly from set
6P , or equivalently, from inside of the nested set PW , so
that the posterior probability is P (PWS |PdW ), just as
in the Be case—there is no observer selection effect in the
Warden Cafeteria problem. A Pick directly from the ob-
server set is the same as a Be on that set (see Appendix
A). What causes a change in the posterior probability is
a Pick on a set in which P is nested, such as W .
IV. INCLUSIVE SELECTION
However many nested sets we have, there are two pos-
sibilities: either there is just a selection on the innermost
set (a Be, unless there is a way to directly Pick from it
as in the Warden Cafeteria problem), which we call in-
clusive selection, or there is also at least one selection on
one of the enclosing sets (a Pick in all of our examples be-
cause we do not consider any sets enclosed by (to the left
of) P ), which we call exclusive selection. The selection
in the Prisoner Problem is inclusive and in the Warden
Problem it is exclusive.
Suppose we have a larger enclosing set, E, in which P
and W are nested. For the Prisoner and Warden Prob-
lems, this could be the set of all prisons, each of which
has their own small-to-large cellblock ratio. We can even
take E to encompass everything that we deem possible—
such as a set of universes in all possible configurations.
Then we define two possibilities for the reality:
The inclusiverse: All things we deem possible
are realized.
An exclusiverse: Only some of the things we
deem possible are realized.
The key question is whether all things to which we assign
a nonzero probability actually occur (inclusive selection),
or there are some mutually exclusive possibilities (exclu-
sive selection). Perhaps a quantum example is useful.
If one assumes that quantum theory is unitary and all
pieces of the wave function with nonzero amplitude are
realized, so that Schro¨dinger’s cat is both alive and dead
(as in the Many Worlds case), that is inclusive selection.
If one assumes that the wave-function collapses to a spe-
cific eigenvalue, so that Schro¨dinger’s cat is alive or dead,
not both, that is an exclusive selection. In the rest of this
section we study inclusive selection, though not its im-
plications for reality.
Let’s consider inclusive selection for the Prisoner Prob-
lem, but with a much more modest set, where E is the
set of all prisons we consider and the only selection is the
self-selection of the prisoner. If we think that there are
exactly two types of prisons, say with all S cellblocks or
all L cellblocks, then the key to inclusiveness is that we
calculate probabilities under the assumption that both
types of prisons exist—there is no Pick on the selection
of E needed. We explicitly show the sum over subsets of
E, e, so when we do the same calculation for the exclusive
case, the difference will be apparent. For simplicity we
will assume that the number of prisoners for any J = S
or L cellblock is the same across all prisons, so n¯J,e = n¯J ,
and similarly we assume the number of prisoners per cell-
block matching datum d is the same, m¯J,e = m¯J . The
subsets Ee differ only in their fractions of S and L worlds.
The likelihood for the inclusive case comes out the same
as in the Be case, Eq. (4):
P (PdWE|PWSE)
=
∑
e
P (PdWEe|PWSEe)P (PWSEe|PWSE)
=
m¯S
n¯S
∑
e
P (PWSEe|PWSE) = m¯S
n¯S
= 1. (13)
There is no e dependence in the first term, since we as-
sumed that n¯S and m¯S do not depend on e. The prior
to Be in cellblock type S with inclusive selection of E is
P (PWSE) =
∑
e
P (PWSEe|PWEe)P (PWEe)
=
∑
e
n¯S,e
n¯,e
P (WSEe|WEe) n¯,e
n¯
P (WEe) (14)
=
n¯S
n¯
∑
e
P (WSEe|WEe)P (WEe) = n¯S
n¯
P (WSE),
which is the same as Eq. (5), just the prior probability
of picking a world of type S weighted by the number of
observers per world type S. Note that a factor of 1/n¯,e
and n¯,e cancel here. Therefore, the posterior probability
of you being in a cellblock type S given datum d with an
inclusive selection of E is the same as Eq. (6),
P (PWSE|PdWE) = P (PdWE|PWSE)P (PWSE)∑
J P (PdWE|PWJE)P (PWJE)
=
m¯S
n¯S
n¯S
n¯ P (WSE)∑
J
m¯J
n¯J
n¯J
n¯ P (WJE)
=
m¯S
m¯
P (WSE)
=P (WSE), (15)
just the prior probability of picking a world of type S,
and we again get REP/W = 1 as in Eq. (7). There is no
net observer selection effect for the Prisoner Problem in
the inclusive case (REP/W = 1). Generalizing, if we are
considering a problem where observers are selected only
by being, and there is no other selection—all allowed pos-
sibilities are realized, as in the inclusiverse—then there
is no OSE.
V. EXCLUSIVE SELECTION
Let us analyze the Prisoner Problem with exclusive
selection. The key difference from the inclusive case is
that we must Pick a subset Ee: although we posit that
7there are multiple possibilities Ee, only one of them is
actually realized. As we said in the previous section, if
E is the set of everything possible, and we take reality
to correspond to a smaller subset, then we live in an
exclusiverse. But we will focus on a more mundane set:
for the Prisoner Problem, those subsets of E are prisons.
The defining characteristic of these subsets Ee is the
fraction of worlds of type S they contain, which we define
as y. So the probability of picking an S world,
y ≡ P (WSEe|WEe), (16)
and a world of type L, 1 − y = P (WLEe|WEe), is the
same for all elements of a given Ee. That is, Ee is com-
pletely specified by its y—in fact we will simply label
these subsets by y. Again we assume for simplicity that
the number of prisoners per type of world is independent
of e: n¯J,e = n¯J and m¯J,e = m¯J . But note that the aver-
age number of prisoners per cellblock in a given prison,
n¯,e varies from prison to prison:
n¯,e = n¯SP (WS,e) + n¯LP (WL,e)
≡ n¯y = n¯S(y + ρ(1− y)). (17)
The likelihood in the exclusive case is the same as in
inclusive case Eq. (13) because the Pick of subset Ee on
the first term in the sum is neutered:
P (PdW
|E|PWS |E)
=
∑
e
P (PdW
-Ee|PWS -Ee)P (PWS |Ee|PWS |E)
=
m¯S
n¯S
∑
e
P (PWS
|Ee|PWS |E) = m¯S
n¯S
= 1. (18)
However, the prior is different because now we have to
first Pick a subset Ee, and there is not a n¯,e to cancel the
1/n¯,e as there was in Eq. (14),
P (PWS
|E) =
∑
e
P (PWS
-Ee|PW -Ee)P (PW |Ee)
=
∑
e
n¯S,e
n¯,e
P (WS
-Ee|W -Ee)P (Ee)
=
∑
y
y
y + ρ(1− y)P (
|y). (19)
For the last line, we have assumed again n¯S,e = n¯S , re-
labeled the subsets Ee by y, and used the definitions for
y in Eq. (16) and n¯,e in Eq. (17). The sum covers all
values of y from 0 to 1 with nonzero P ( |y), which is
the probability of picking an ensemble element of type y
(it is shorthand for P (PW |Ey)—see Eqs. (A13-A18)).
(Note that as with the Warden problem, the SIA gives the
wrong answer here because P (Ee) should not be weighted
by n¯,e in Eq. (19) since we are first Picking subsets of
E.) Similarly for L,
P (PdW
|E|PWL |E) = m¯L
n¯L
,
P (PWL
|E) =
n¯L
n¯S
∑
y
1− y
y + ρ(1− y)P (
|y). (20)
Let us use Bayes’ Law again to obtain the posterior
probability of you being in a cellblock type S or L given
datum d in the exclusive case, which has the same form
as the inclusive case Eq. (15) except with Picks on E,
which we obtain from Eqs. (18–20):
P (PWS
|E|PdW |E)
=
P (PdW
|E|PWS |E)P (PWS |E)∑
J P (PdW
|E|PWJ |E)P (PWJ |E)
=
∑
y
y
y+ρ(1−y)P (
|y)∑
y
y+
m¯L
m¯S
(1−y)
y+ρ(1−y) P (
|y)
=
∑
y
y
ρ−(ρ−1)yP (
|y)∑
y
1
ρ−(ρ−1)yP (
|y)
, (21)
P (PWL
|E|PdW |E)
=
P (PdW
|E|PWL |E)P (PWL |E)∑
J P (PdW
|E|PWJ |E)P (PWJ |E)
=
m¯L
m¯S
∑
y
1−y
y+ρ(1−y)P (
|y)∑
y
y+
m¯L
m¯S
(1−y)
y+ρ(1−y) P (
|y)
=
∑
y
1−y
ρ−(ρ−1)yP (
|y)∑
y
1
ρ−(ρ−1)yP (
|y)
,(22)
where we use m¯S = m¯L of Eq. (3) and we rewrote the
denominators to collect the y dependence. We are again
interested in the ratio of L to S posterior probabilities,
R
|E
P ≡
P (PWL
|E|PdW |E)
P (PWS |E|PdW |E) =
∑
y
1−y
ρ−(ρ−1)yP (
|y)∑
y
y
ρ−(ρ−1)yP (
|y)
.
(23)
We want to normalize this to,
R
|E
W ≡
P (WL
|E)
P (WS |E)
= (24)∑
e P (WL
-Ee|W -Ee)P (W |Ee)∑
e P (WS
-Ee|W -Ee)P (W |Ee) =
∑
y(1− y)P ( |y)∑
y yP (
|y)
.
We can see immediately that if there is only one value
Y for which P ( |y = Y ) is nonzero, both R
|E
P and R
|E
W
are equal to (1 − Y )/Y and their ratio, R |EP/W is 1—no
observer selection effect. That’s because that is really the
inclusive case—while there is a Pick on E, it is neutered,
and all of the values (i.e., the one value) are realized. So
for the exclusive case, there needs to be more than one
allowed value of y.
So let us explore different assumptions for the function
P ( |y), which, to remind you, is our prior probability for
8elements of E with S-world fraction y. For simplicity, let
us define the probability density,
p( |y) ≡ P ( |[y, y + dy])/dy (25)
where now y is not a set of discrete values, but all real
numbers in [0, 1]. We can then write the sums in Eqs.
(23) and (24) as integrals:
R
|E
P =
∫ 1
0
dy 1−yρ−(ρ−1)yp(
|y)∫ 1
0
dy yρ−(ρ−1)yp(
|y)
, (26)
R
|E
W =
∫ 1
0
dy(1− y)p( |y)∫ 1
0
dy yp( |y)
. (27)
A. Near a Single Point
Let us first explore the case where we take y to have a
nonzero probability near a single point Y , in particular
that p( |y) is constant over the range Y − σ to Y + σ,
where of course σ is no larger than Y or 1 − Y so that
the points are on the range 0 to 1:
p( |y)near =
1
2σ
(Θ(y− (Y −σ))−Θ(y− (Y +σ))). (28)
(Θ(x) is the step function, equal to 0 for x < 0 and 1 for
x ≥ 1.) Plugging this into Eq. (27), for the prior ratio
probabilities or picking L worlds to S worlds, we get
R
|E
W =
[y − 12y2]Y+σY−σ
[ 12y
2]Y+σY−σ
=
1− Y
Y
, (29)
just as we obtained for a single point. (This is true be-
cause the integrand in the numerator and denominator of
R
|E
W are linear in y.) The expression for R
|E
P is more com-
plicated because of the denominator of the integrands. In
the limit of σ → 0, R |EP is,
R
|E
P '
1− Y
Y
[
1− 1
3
σ2
ρ− 1
(ρ(1− Y ) + Y )Y (1− Y )
]
, (30)
and thus their ratio is,
R
|E
P/W ' 1−
1
3
σ2
ρ− 1
(ρ(1− Y ) + Y )Y (1− Y ) . (31)
Thus if p( |y) is nonzero within ±σ of a single point Y ,
there is a small observer selection effect of order σ2. In
the limit that ρ→∞ (actually one must be careful when
Y is near 1, so really we take ρ(1− Y )→∞),
R
|E
P/W → 1−
1
3
σ2
1
Y (1− Y )2 . (32)
So the closer we restrict our prior to be near a single
point Y , the less R
|E
P/W differs from 1, and this behavior
is independent of ρ.
B. Flat Prior
The simplest prior assumption is that every value of y
is equally likely,
p( |y)flat = 1. (33)
From Eq. (27) this gives equal probability of picking S
and L worlds,
R
|E
W =
[y − 12y2]10
[ 12y
2]10
= 1, (34)
which we also could have obtained from Eq. (29) for
Y = σ = 1/2. The posterior ratio of being in L and
S worlds, R
|E
P , is thus unchanged when normalized to
R
|E
W = 1, and for their ratio we obtain,
R
|E
P/W =
1− (ln ρ+ 1)/ρ
ln ρ− 1 + 1/ρ →
1
ln ρ− 1 , (35)
where we take the limit of ρ → ∞ (this approximation
is good only for ρ & 100). So for a flat prior, we get an
observer selection effect which goes roughly as 1/ ln ρ, in
between the original Prisoner Problem, RP/W = 1 = ρ
0,
and Warden Problem, RP |/W = ρ
−1.
If the point of choosing a flat prior is to minimize the
effect of assumptions on the outcome, it might make more
sense to use inclusive selection instead of a flat-prior ex-
clusive selection—to say that all values of y are realized
rather than one of them is realized with equal probability
for each. Assuming the latter leads to a small observer
selection effect while the former does not.
C. Two Separated Points
To get a sense of how much the Prisoner Problem in
the exclusive case can approach the Warden Problem,
it suffices to consider a prior with nonzero probabilities
at two points, Y ± σ, where 0 < Y < 1 and 0 < σ ≤
min (1/2, Y, 1− Y ), so that both points lie in the range
[0, 1]:
p( |y)two =
1
2
(δ(y − (Y − σ)) + δ(y − (Y + σ))). (36)
9(δ(x) = 1 for x = 0 and is 0 otherwise.) Since the in-
tegrands in R
|E
W are linear the σ terms cancel, and we
again get R
|E
W = (1− Y )/Y . For R
|E
P , we obtain,
R
|E
P =
1− Y (2− 1/ρ) + (Y + σ)(Y − σ)(1− 1/ρ)
Y − (Y + σ)(Y − σ)(1− 1/ρ) .
(37)
If we assume Y = 1/2, and define k ≡ 2σ, then R |EW = 1
and Eq. (37) reduces to,
R
|E
P/W (Y = 1/2) =
1− k2 + (1 + k2)/ρ
1 + k2 + (1− k2)/ρ . (38)
Note that 0 < k ≤ 1. For k near 0, R |EP approaches
1—two points very close together is very much like the
inclusive case. For Y = 1/2 and k = 1, i.e. when the two
points are y = 0 and y = 1,
R
|E
P/W (y = 0 or 1) =
1
ρ
. (39)
In other words, the Prisoner Problem in the exclusive
case where the prior is that the prison is either all L
cellblocks (y = 0) or all S cellblocks (y = 1), has the
same observer selection effect as the Warden Problem
in Eq. (12). By insisting on an either-or-Pick on the
enclosing set E, we have, in essence, turned a Be for the
Prisoner into a Pick on which top-level subset she is in.
So we can go anywhere from no OSE, as in the Prisoner
case, to a Warden-level 1/ρ OSE simply by adjusting our
prior assumptions. In Fig. 2, we plot R
|E
P/W as a function
of Y for different values of k, which we more generally
define as
k ≡
{
σ
Y Y ≤ 12 ,
σ
1−Y Y ≥ 12 .
(40)
For Y near 0 or 1, or k near 0, R
|E
P/W ' 1 = ρ0, and
the exclusive case is like the inclusive one. The observer
selection effect is maximized for Y = 1/2 and k = 1,
yielding R
|E
P/W = ρ
−1 of Eq. (39).
VI. EXCLUSIVE THEORY SELECTION AND
THE PRESUMPTUOUS PHILOSOPHER
A. Exclusive Theory Selection
Instead of taking E to be the top-level set, consider a
set of theories, Θ. This set of theories might include very
different hypotheses about reality, or they might simply
specify different enclosed subsets, such as,
FIG. 2. How to interpolate between the Prisoner (no OSE)
and Warden (1/ρ OSE) cases: For exclusive selection over
an ensemble {Ey} (y is the fraction of worlds of type S in
that ensemble element) which consists of two separated points
y = Y ± σ, we plot a measure of the OSE, R |EP/W (the ratio
of the ratios of posteriors to priors for L and S worlds for
the exclusive Pick over ensemble E), versus Y for ρ = 10
(the ratio of the number of people per world of type L to
that of type S). The OSE depends on how far apart the
points are, which is characterized by k ∈ (0, 1] defined in Eq.
(40). Contours top to bottom are for k = 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75
and 1. There is no OSE for k → 0 (akin to the Prisoner
case). The maximal OSE (minimal value of R
|E
P/W ) is for
k = 1 at Y = 1/2 (akin to the Warden case), with a value
R
|E
P/W (Y = 1/2, k = 1) = 1/ρ = 0.1.
ΘL : “All cellblocks are type L’”
ΘS : “All cellblocks are type S” (41)
These two theories could have been encoded in E: they
are Ey=0 and Ey=1 respectively. But we tend to approach
theories differently from ensembles, notably that usually
one assumes that only one theory is true, that we have to
Pick a theory before proceeding further. This is exclusive
theory selection, and the probabilities are the same as in
Section V. For example, if our prior for the two theories
in Eq. (41) are equal, R
|Θ
W = P (WL
|Θ)/P (WS |Θ) =
P (ΘL)/P (ΘS) = 1, then
R
|Θ
P/W =
P (PWL
|Θ|PdW |Θ)
P (PWS |Θ|PdW |Θ) =
1
ρ
, (42)
just as in Eq. (39). (This is assuming typicality (the
SSA). Again the SIA gives the wrong answer because it
does not take into account selections on enclosing sets,
here the Pick selection on mutually exclusive theories.)
It is possible to have inclusive selection of a theory,
where one assumes multiple theories are realized. For
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example, one could posit that prisons vary from country
to country, so both theories in Eq. (41) would be real-
ized somewhere. There is then no Pick on Θ, and one
recovers the probabilities in the inclusive section, where
there were no observer selection effects (RΘP/W = 1). One
can even have a seemingly fundamental theory be part
of an inclusive selection. For example, the landscape in
string theory allows different regions of the larger uni-
verse to manifest different low energy theories with their
own fundamental constants. If one posits that one can
be an observer in any region of the landscape that has
observers, that is inclusive theory selection.
As we said, the main point of this paper is to show
that the conclusions one draws depend on the assump-
tions made. If we assume exclusive selection, such as the
theories in Eq. (41) being mutually exclusive, we will
conclude that there are observer selection effects, but if
we assume an inclusive case, such as half the prisons have
only S cellblocks and half have only L cellblocks, we will
conclude that there are no such effects.
B. Probing a Multiverse?
Suppose we consider both possibilities about the se-
lection from set P through set E: that it is inclusive as
discussed in Section IV, or exclusive, as discussed in Sec-
tion V, and treat these as competing hypotheses, Θin or
Θex. If we treat these hypotheses as mutually exclusive,
with a Pick on set Θ, the overall selection is exclusive.
But let us focus on the rest of the selection, from P to
E, which is inclusive or exclusive. We can then in prin-
ciple use our data to alter our posterior probabilities for
each hypothesis. Suppose we define E to be everything,
so that the inclusive (exclusive) case corresponds to the
inclusiverse (an exclusiverse). How do these terms relate
to the term ‘multiverse’? If taken literally, multiverse
simply means that there are more realities than the one
we perceive, either via something like parallel universes
or just the universe being so large that realities similar
to ours occur in some other part of it. That does not
actually imply that all possible universes are realized. A
set of a few parallel universes, which we will call a partial
multiverse, is an exclusiverse, since not everything pos-
sible is realized. If all possibilities are realized, to avoid
ambiguity we will call it the complete multiverse. So,
The inclusiverse is the same as the complete
multiverse: All things we deem possible are
realized.
An exclusiverse is the same as a universe or
a partial multiverse: Some things we deem
possible are not realized.
The question of this subsection is
Can we determine whether we live in the in-
clusiverse or an exclusiverse simply by using
a datum such as the date?
To get a handle on this, let us consider the Prisoner
Problem again, where our selection in sets PW is a Be.
Let PW again be embedded in a larger set E, which itself
is considered in the context of one of two hypotheses,
Θin : “Inclusive selection on E”
Θex : “Exclusive selection on E” (43)
We need new notation to combine these hypotheses in
a single probability, with a “controlled-Pick” on E, so
that there is a Pick on E for hypothesis ex, but not for
hypothesis in. For this we put a left arrow pointing from
Θ to the Pick on E:
P (PW |
←−−−
EΘin) = P (PWEΘin),
P (PW |
←−−−
EΘex) = P (PW
|EΘex). (44)
Using this notation, what we want to calculate is the
posterior probability for hypotheses h = in or ex given
datum d:
Ph|d ≡ P (PW |
←−−−
E |Θh|PdW |
←−−
E |Θ) =
Pd|hPh
Pd
(45)
=
P (PdW
|←−−−E -Θh|PW |
←−−−
E -Θh)P (PW |
←−−−
E |Θh)
P (PdW |
←−−
E |Θ)
.
If we define our prior probabilities for h = in and ex to
be α and β, respectively, i.e.,
Pin ≡ P (PW |
←−−−−
E |Θin) ≡ α,
Pex ≡ P (PW |
←−−−−
E |Θex) ≡ β, (46)
then our posteriors are simply,
Pin|d =
αPd|in
αPd|in + βPd|ex
,
Pex|d =
βPd|ex
αPd|in + βPd|ex
. (47)
Note that we also need priors for the probabilities of
the elements of E. For simplicity, let us assume that
the only ensembles with nonzero probability are y = 0
(all L-type cellblocks) or y = 1 (all S-type cellblocks),
which we saw in Eq. (39) gives maximal OSE for the ex
case. There is of course no OSE in the in case. For the
inclusive case, let’s assume equal probabilities for y = 0
and 1:
P (E0
-Θin|E -Θin) = P (E1 -Θin|E -Θin) = 1
2
, (48)
but for the exclusive case let’s allow them to vary,
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P (E0
-Θex|E -Θex) = q, P (E1 -Θex|E -Θex) = p, (49)
where p+ q = 1. Our likelihoods are then
Pd|in =
m¯
n¯
=
2
ρ+ 1
,
Pd|ex = q
m¯
n¯0
+ p
m¯
n¯1
= p+
q
ρ
. (50)
We can then plug these likelihoods into Eq. (47) to obtain
the posterior probabilities. It is clear that they depend
on p (with q = 1− p).
For p = 1/2, so that the y = 0 and y = 1 weights in
the ex case match those of the in case in Eq. (48), we
obtain posterior probabilities,
Pin|d ≡ α′|p=1/2 = α
α+ β (ρ+1)
2
4ρ
,
Pex|d ≡ β′|p=1/2 = β
β + α 4ρ(ρ+1)2
. (51)
Since α and β are ≥ 0 and ρ > 1 (so that (ρ+ 1)2 > 4ρ),
the denominator for α′ (β′) is larger (smaller) than 1,
and datum d seems to decrease (increase) our credence in
inclusive (exclusive) selection on E, except in the trivial
case where α or β is zero. This would seem to argue that
if E is a set of universes (not just prisons), we could use
observer data to alter our probability that we live in the
inclusiverse!
But there is a second prior in this problem, that of
p (with q = 1 − p). We chose p = 1/2 to make the
probabilities for y = 0 and y = 1 the same as those
in the inclusive case. An equally reasonable hypothesis
would be to set p equal to the value that gives the same
value for datum d for each hypothesis, so that Pd|in =
Pd|ex = 2/(ρ+ 1). With a little algebra, we see that this
holds for
p =
1
ρ+ 1
. (52)
For this value of p, the denominators in Eq. (47) are 1
(since α+ β = 1), and
Pin|d ≡ α′|p=1/(ρ+1) = α,
Pex|d ≡ β′|p=1/(ρ+1) = β, (53)
so for this value of p we gain no information about hy-
potheses in and ex from datum d.
What happened? When we thought, due to Eq. (51),
that we had obtained information about hypotheses in
and ex from datum d, what we really learned about was
the probability of getting datum d based on two factors,
whether the selection from E was inclusive or exclusive,
and the priors we had for the elements of E in each case.
To the extent that d tells us anything about these cases,
it is about a combination of these factors. We cannot dis-
entangle these factors here. In general, one cannot claim
that data tell us about whether we are in the inclusiverse
(aka the complete multiverse) or not unless one can show
that all other factors which separate the inclusiverse from
exclusiverse hypotheses are fixed.
C. Presumptuous Philosopher
In the Introduction, we noted that some authors ar-
gued against the Doomsday argument by assuming the
Self-Indication Assumption (SIA): that we should weight
the probability of some situation by the number of ob-
servers in it. As we have discussed, this is essen-
tially a kludge, adding the factor that we found in
Be choices without the clearcut mathematical rationale
we presented (based on applying the SSA—typicality—
properly). This is perhaps why it has been referred to as
“controversial” [11, 12].
Nick Bostrom argues against the SIA with the follow-
ing problem [7, 9]. A philosopher is told that theories
ΘL and ΘS have equal probabilities prior to taking into
account any observer information. This is like the prob-
lem of exclusive theory selection we considered in Section
VI A, except that there is no datum d favoring S over L.
The philosopher states that there is no need to test which
is right (and since this is exclusive selection, only one is
right) because, by the SIA, ΘL is ρ times more likely than
ΘS because there are ρ times as many observers in that
case.
Bostrom is right that the philosopher is being presump-
tuous here, and this is a good argument against the SIA—
that if one is to Pick between ΘS and ΘL, there should
be no effect from there being more observers in the latter
case, because we are picking a theory. This is simply an
example of what we have found regarding the SIA—that
it gives the wrong answer when there is a selection from
an enclosing set, here Θ. But there is no reason to have
invoked the SIA in the first place.
In short, the Presumptuous Philosopher has no bearing
on our results because it argues against the SIA, which
we did not use.
We note, however, that if the philosopher correctly uses
the SSA and is asked about an inclusive problem, whether
she is more likely to be in a domain of the inclusiverse
governed by theory ΘL or ΘS , she would be correct to
answer that she is more likely to be in the former due the
SSA weighting by number of observers. In that case she
is not presumptuous at all [16].
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VII. TYPICALITY
All of the probabilities we have discussed thus far as-
sume that the selection, Be or Pick, is typical, that, for
example, if the fraction of observers in some subset Pa
of P is na/n, then the probability of selecting a per-
son in that subset is also na/n. Suppose we relax that
assumption and allow atypical selection, where the prob-
ability of selecting a person from subset Pa differs from
na/n—some values of a are intrinsically more likely to
be selected than others [17]. For example, observers at
CERN are not typical of Earth’s population—they are
more likely to be scientists than the population overall.
Srednicki and Hartle[18] describe an atypical selection in
their Eq. (6.1):
“P (q1|T, ξ,D0) =
∑
A
ξAP (q1@A|T,D0@A)” (54)
where q1 is a posterior result, T is a given theory, D0 is
data, ξ is a ‘xerographic distribution,’ which is a set of
copies A of q1 at different locations meeting data D0, and
ξA is the probability weight of xerographic occurrence A
which is not necessarily what we would obtain from a
typical selection. We need to translate this all into our
notation.
A. Atypical notation
Let us define ξ0 to be a Typical Be, a typical selection
on the set P (embedded in set W ). We are interested in
subsets Pa of P for some property a of the people in P :
ξ0a ≡ P (PaW ) =
n¯a
n¯
, ξ0a|d ≡ P (PaW |PdW ) =
m¯a
m¯
. (55)
Now let us define an Atypical Be using ξ to mark the
atypical selection point,
ξa ≡ P (ξPaW ), ξa|d = P (ξPaW |ξPdW ), (56)
which may not simply be a ratio of numbers of elements
of set P . However, for a given atypical selection ξ on
P , we will show that we can always find a new set P˜ ,
with number of people per world ˜¯n, upon which a typical
selection ξ˜0,
ξ˜0a ≡ P (P˜aW ) =
˜¯na
˜¯n
, ξ˜0a|d = P (P˜aW |P˜dW ) =
˜¯ma
˜¯m
, (57)
gives the same answer. Here the tilde quantities are re-
lated to their counterparts by some scaling factors κa and
κa|d:
n˜a ≡ κana, n˜aK ≡ κanaK ,
m˜a ≡ κa|dma, m˜aK ≡ κa|dmaK . (58)
We claim that the Atypical Be on P , ξ, is equal to the
Typical Be on P˜ , ξ˜0,
ξa = ξ˜
0
a, ξa|d = ξ˜
0
a|d, (59)
if we define κa as the ratio of atypical to typical selection,
κa ≡ cξa
ξ0a
, κa|d ≡ cd
ξa|d
ξ0a|d
, (60)
where constants c and cd are independent of a. We have
the freedom to vary c and cd because the overall numbers
of people in P˜ do not matter, just the ratios we are in-
terested in. However, they do affect the values for ˜¯n and
˜¯m:
˜¯n =
∑
a
˜¯na =
∑
a
κan¯a = cn¯
∑
a
ξa = cn¯, (61)
˜¯m =
∑
a
˜¯ma =
∑
a
κa|dm¯a = cdm¯
∑
a
ξa|d = cdm¯,
using the fact that probabilities for even atypically se-
lected people sum to 1. Note that we can choose to set c
and cd equal 1 and have ˜¯n = n¯ and ˜¯m = m¯, but we need
not do this. Now we can show Eq. (59) does in fact hold,
ξa =
1
c
κaξ
0
a =
1
c
κa
n¯a
n¯
=
˜¯na
cn¯
=
˜¯na
˜¯n
= ξ˜0a, (62)
ξa|d =
1
cd
κa|dξ0a|d =
1
cd
κa|d
m¯a
m¯
=
˜¯ma
cdm¯
=
˜¯ma
˜¯m
= ξ˜0a|d,
and we can write our atypical selection on P as a typical
selection on P˜ with number of elements defined by Eq.
(58) with κ defined in Eq. (60).
B. Posterior probability
We can now write Srednicki and Hartle’s Eq. (54)
in our notation. We want the posterior probabil-
ity P (PWK |PdW ), but with an Atypical Be, i.e.,
P (ξPWK |ξPdW ):
P (ξPWK |ξPdW ) =
∑
a
ξa|dP (PaWK |PadW )
=
(∑
a
ξa|d
m¯aK
m¯a
)
P (WK) =
˜¯mK
˜¯m
P (WK), (63)
which we write as a Typical Be on set P˜ defined by Eqs.
(58, 60). This is the same expression as for a Be in Eq.
(6) with the elements from set P˜ . Note that if we con-
dition on a subset a, the selection within that subset is
typical (all atypicality comes from nontrivial weighting
of the different subsets Pa), thus P (
ξPaWK |ξPadW ) =
P (PaWK |PadW ).
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C. Atypical example
Let’s see how this atypical notation works in an ex-
ample using prisoners of two types. Suppose half the
cellblocks are filled with humans (a = h) and half filled
with zombies (a = z). Humans are distributed as in the
Prisoner Problem, n¯hL = ρn¯hS and m¯hL = m¯hS . Zom-
bies have the same distribution in cells, n¯zL = ρn¯zS , but
let us assume that all zombies who can think well enough
to formulate a question, think they meet datum d, i.e.,
m¯zL = ρm¯zS . If you think it is equally likely that you
are a human or a zombie (because half the prisoners are
humans, half zombies), and for simplicity you assume
P (WS) = P (WL) = 1/2, then you calculate the Typical
Be posterior probabilities,
P (PWS |PdW ) = m¯S
m¯
P (WS) =
2
3 + ρ
, (64)
P (PWL|PdW ) = m¯L
m¯
P (WL) =
1 + ρ
3 + ρ
. (65)
Thus, unlike the Prisoner Problem, there is an observer
selection effect RP/W = (1 + ρ)/2, favoring that you are
in WL, because there are more zombies matching d in
WL.
But suppose you think it is quite unlikely that you are a
zombie, say because zombies don’t usually use Bayesian
reasoning. For simplicity, you take κh|d = 1 and set
κz|d to be some very small number κ—one zombie out of
every κ thinks well enough to calculate the probabilities
we have been discussing (the ratio of chances you are
a zombie to you are a human is κ, not 1). Then you
calculate the Atypical Be,
P (ξPWS |ξPdW ) =
˜¯mS
˜¯m
P (WS) =
1 + κ
2 + κ(1 + ρ)
, (66)
P (ξPWL|ξPdW ) =
˜¯mL
˜¯m
P (WL) =
1 + κρ
2 + κ(1 + ρ)
. (67)
There is still an observer selection effect RP/W = (1 +
κρ)/(1 + κ), favoring WL, but note that when κ → 0,
RP/W → 1, because there is no OSE due to the human
prisoners. If you assume you are not a zombie, then you
take κ = 0 and all probabilities spring from Ph—in fact
if you are going to do that, you might as well drop the
label h and ignore the zombies
D. Redefine the conditional
Another way of addressing an atypical selection which
is due to different subsets a meeting the conditional with
different relative frequencies, is to redefine the condi-
tional so the weights are the same. For example, in the
case above, we deweighted zombies by a factor κ because
only that fraction of zombies could formulate the ques-
tion. So why not limit the sets P and Pd to the subset PQ
of P of people who have formulated the Bayesian ques-
tion in the first place? As we discuss in Appendix A,
adding such a conditional is not just another label, but
actually redefining the set P as set [PQ]. Then all we
need to do is define set P˜ ≡ [PQ], and typical selection
on P˜ gives the probabilities for those atypical people who
ask the question.
E. Boltzmann brains
Normal observers are necessarily far from equilibrium
and experience an arrow of time of increasing entropy
[19]. Fortunately, the observable Universe is in a rela-
tively low entropy state [20, 21]. How did it get that way?
Ludwig Boltzmann argued that a low entropy ‘world’
could arise as a stupendously rare fluctuation within a
higher entropy world [15, 22]. The prevailing theory of
cosmology is more subtle: that our Universe began within
a patch of smooth spacetime, which inflated for a time at
an exponential rate [23] (for a review, see [24]). Though
inflation has ended here, it has likely not stopped ev-
erywhere in the larger Universe. Further, our observable
Universe has seemingly entered another era of exponen-
tial expansion, and seems slated to approach de Sitter
space (a spacetime with a positive cosmological constant
Λ and vanishing matter density) asymptotically.
If so, the empty places greatly outnumber the places
where normal observers can live. Further, de Sitter space
is a thermal state (with a temperature which depends
only on the cosmological constant: T =
√
Λ/12pi2) [25],
and thus seems subject to worlds fluctuating into exis-
tence via stupendously rare fluctuations. And one may
not need such a large fluctuation, the size of a galaxy or
a planet, to create observers, one may need only ‘Boltz-
mann brains’ [26–28], which are spontaneously formed
configurations of matter that, for a brief period, are self-
aware, including ones that think they are having the
thoughts you are having now. Such events are still ex-
tremely improbable, occurring at a rate ∼ e−∆S , where
∆S is the reduction in entropy that the fluctuation rep-
resents. For a brain-sized object, the timescale to form
them, τBB , will be enormous, of order e
1070 . (Note that
the units don’t actually matter with numbers this large—
switching from Planck times to Hubble times changes the
googol-sized exponents by only about 140.) But this is
small compared to the timescale for a Hubble volume to
fluctuate into existence, τHV of order e
10122 . This is time
enough to form googolplexes of Boltzmann brains, far
more than the number of normal observers [15].
One might ask why this is a problem. We do not
seem to be Boltzmann brains. In fact, we need to as-
sume that we are normal observers in order to do sci-
ence. And if one conditions on the assumption that
we are normal observers, the probability of us being a
freak observer is zero, no matter how common they are
(P (freak|normal) = 0). The problem is that if freak ob-
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servers outnumber us by a large enough factor, say a
googolplex, there are many, many of them that think
that they are experiencing any given moment that any
normal observer does, and it is not safe to assume that
you are a normal observer. So the problem is one of
consistency: you need to assume that your observations
reflect reality to do science, and thus it is a problem if the
resulting science says that this assumption is very likely
to be false. The problem is especially acute if there is an
infinite volume of spacetime which could spawn Boltz-
mann brains, and only a finite volume containing normal
observers. This possibility led Don Page to argue that
the Universe must decay rapidly, via bubbles of vacuum
decay [29], so as to avoid any infinite patches of space-
time, leading him to predict a lifetime of our Universe
shorter than about 20 billion years [30]. Many papers
have been written with less drastic proposed solutions,
such as having the physical ‘constants’ vary over time
[31].
We would like to know if our analysis of typicality has
any impact on the Boltzmann brain problem. Since freak
observers may be fooled into thinking that they are nor-
mal only for a small fraction of their ‘life,’ we use observer
moments instead of observers. Let us assume that there
are two types of observer moments per comoving Hubble
volume, normal (n), and freak (f), with n¯f = ρn¯n for
some constant ρ which now can be any nonnegative real
number, and n¯ = n¯n+ n¯f is the total number of observer
moments per comoving Hubble volume. The probability
to Be a normal observer moment is just the fraction of
observer moments per comoving Hubble volume which
are normal:
P (Pn) =
n¯n
n¯
=
1
1 + ρ
, (68)
which is not close to 1 unless ρ→ 0. But what we really
want is the fraction of observer moments in which the
observer is self-aware and could ask a question like “Am
I normal?” in the first place. The typical freak observer
moment which superficially seems like a normal observer
moment might not pass that test. Let us assume that
freak observer moments are κ times likely as normal mo-
ments to do so. Then we are interested in the atypical
selection P (ξPn), which is a typical selection on set P˜ ,
scaled from P by κ on the freak observer moments,
P (ξPn) = P (P˜n) =
˜¯nn
˜¯n
=
1
1 + κρ
. (69)
This probability can go to 1 even if ρ is large, if κ is
sufficiently small. But if ρ is huge, as the recurrence
time of de Sitter space argues, the probability of being
in a normal observer moment is near one only if there is
an argument that κ is zero.
Boddy et al. [32] make such a case. They argue that
if the theory is unitary (“many worlds”), de Sitter space
is in a stationary state. Fluctuations do occur, including
ones which correspond to Boltzmann brains, but they do
not actually correspond to self-aware freak observer mo-
ments because nothing happens in a stationary state—
there is no decoherence corresponding to the splitting of
worlds. If true, this is akin to setting κ = 0, since being
a self-aware freak observer moment is not only atypical,
it does not happen. Obviously if κ = 0, P (ξPn) = 1
independent of how big ρ is.
How might this argument be affected by the fact that
our Universe contains matter? Well, rarely, stable mat-
ter could play the role of an ‘environment’ by interact-
ing with a Boltzmann brain, causing decoherence. Such
atypical Boltzmann brains might thus actually be self-
aware. How rare is rare? An upper bound to the fraction
κ of such atypical matter-interacting fluctuations is the
fraction of Hubble volumes which contain even a single
matter particle. Let’s define the entropy of a Hubble-
volume-sized fluctuation entropy change,
S ≡ 10122, (70)
so that the fluctuation time τHV for Hubble volumes is
∼ eS and the fluctuation time for Boltzmann brains τBB
is ‘about’ e
√S (more accurately, ∼ eS0.57). Then the
number of freak observers is huge: n¯f ∼ τHV /τBB ∼ eS .
The number of normal observers per comoving Hubble
volume is proportional to the volume of spacetime in
which they can occur. A healthy upper bound on n¯n is S
(e.g., 1020moments/lyr3s×1031lyr3×1064yrs×107s/yr),
so that
ρ ≡ n¯f
n¯n
∼ eS , (71)
i.e. the number of freak observer moments is so vast
that the number of normal observer moments is irrel-
evant. Then the probability of being normal vanishes:
P (Pn) ' 0 to a very good approximation, yielding a
seemingly serious consistency problem. But only frac-
tion κ of freak observers actually can be self-aware by
the argument above, where κ must be smaller than the
fraction of Hubble volumes with any matter in them. de
Sitter space expands exponentially fast, so soon there is
fewer than one particle per Hubble volume. By the time
of the first Boltzmann brains, the fraction of Hubble vol-
umes with a single matter particle is
κ < e−τBB < e−e
√S
. (72)
This is exponentially smaller than ρ is big, and κρ does go
to zero so that the relevant probability that we are nor-
mal observers, P (ξPn), goes to 1. In summary, by this ar-
gument Boltzmann brains are overwhelmingly plentiful,
but those which are atypically self-aware are very rare,
and thus not a problem. That matter effects are negli-
gible is unlikely to come as a surprise to those already
convinced by the arguments of Ref. [32]. We do think
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it is interesting that there is a typicality factor so strong
that it overwhelms even an exponentially large factor like
the ratio of freak to normal observers (κρ 1).
F. Scarce observers
Thus far we have assumed that observers in models
are not rare. In fact, we have assumed that there is one
observer per ‘cell’. What if we relax this assumption and
assume cells are filled only with probability pF? Hartle,
Hertog, and Srednicki show that there is a different kind
of OSE called ‘first-person probabilities’ [33]. Consider
a set of models ΘK . If pF is small enough, it is possible
for there to be no observers in some or all of them (we
do not necessarily think that assuming ‘scarce observers’
is a reasonable hypothesis, we are merely considering the
consequences of that assumption). First-person proba-
bilities weight models by the probability, p≥1, that there
is at least one observer in the modelone cannot be an ob-
server in a model if there are no observers in it. If there
are nJ observer locations (e.g., cells in a prison block or
Hubble volumes in a Universe) which contain observers
with probability pF , then the probability that there are
no observers in the model is (1− pF )nK , and the proba-
bility that there is at least one observer in the model is
[33],
p≥1K = 1− (1− pF )nK . (73)
Now, the inclusive probability P (PΘK |PΘ) (i.e. mul-
tiple theories are realized—a theoryverse) is not affected
by p≥1K because we are conditioning on there being one
observer (the ‘PΘ’), and the weighting by the number of
observers in each model, pFnK , already takes that into
account. So we have,
P (PΘK)pF =
pFnKP (ΘK)∑
J pFnJP (ΘJ)
=
nK
〈n〉P (ΘK), (74)
where 〈n〉 = ∑J nJP (ΘJ) is the average number of ob-
server cells per model. Models with more observer cells
are favored because it is more likely for an observer to be
in such a model, as expected from our previous results. In
a cosmological model this corresponds to volume weight-
ing [34] where models with greater volume for observers
are favored.
What about the exclusive probability P (P |ΘK |P |Θ),
which is how one generally selects between competing
models? Condition ‘P |Θ’ ensures that there is at least
one observer in one of the models, but to ensure that a
given model meets that criterion, we need to weight the
models by p≥1K [33]:
P (P |ΘK)pF =
(1− (1− pF )nK )P (ΘK)∑
J(1− (1− pF )nJ )P (ΘJ)
. (75)
There are two interesting limits: where observers are
common or rare. First, if pFnK is large for some mod-
els and tiny in others, then p≥1K are close to 1 for the
former models, and they have observers. Define these
models that certainly have observers by subset Θobs and
normalization factor N ≡ ∑J∈Θobs P (ΘJ). Then the
probability becomes,
P (P |ΘK)common ' 1N P (ΘK). (76)
Note that models either ‘pass’ (are in Θobs) or ‘fail’ (are
not in Θobs). If all models we consider pass (Θobs = Θ)
then N = 1, and we obtain the usual expression for a
Pick probability.
If, on the other hand, all the pFnK are small, so there
are no models that certainly have observers (Θobs = ∅),
then p≥1K ' pFnK (because (1−p)n = 1−np+O((np)2))
and the Pick probability becomes,
P (P |ΘK)rare ' pFnKP (ΘK)∑
J pFnJP (ΘJ)
=
nK
〈n〉P (ΘK).(77)
This is the same as the inclusive probability! Even
though we are Picking between mutually exclusive mod-
els K, there is nonetheless a volume weighting factor, not
just a pass/fail selection, due to it being less likely that
scarce observers are in a model with few places for them
to be. So this ‘first-person’ effect of Hartle, Hertog, and
Srednicki is somewhat orthogonal to the observer effect
we have been discussing: ours assumes observers in every
‘cell’, pF = 1, and comes from the difference between in-
clusive and exclusive selection, while theirs assumes the
limit where observers are scarce, pF  1, and is the same
for inclusive and exclusive selection in that limit.
This ‘first-person’ analysis can be used in the context of
freak observers. Suppose we consider two models, S and
L, which differ only in the volume of spacetime in which
freak observers occur. We could assign probability pn for
‘you’ to arise normally per unit volume of spacetime and
pf for a ‘freak’ observer that thinks they are you (i.e.
after any typicality effects have been folded in). Let the
volume of spacetime where normal observers can arise
be mK , and the volume where freaks could arise be nK ,
which is usually much larger. We want the case where
you exist within the model, (1 − (1 − pn)mK ), and that
no freak versions of you exist, (1− pf )nK (as we argued
before, you want to rule out cases where you might be a
freak observer for self-consistency). Let’s refer to this as
‘1n, 0f ’. Then the ratio of exclusive probabilities is,
RP |Θ ≡
P (P1n,0f
|ΘL)
P (P1n,0f |ΘS)
=
(1− (1− pn)mL)
(1− (1− pn)mS )
(1− pf )nL
(1− pf )nS
P (ΘL)
P (ΘS)
(78)
= (1− pf )nL−nSRΘ
→ e−pf (nL−nS)RΘ,
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where RΘ ≡ P (ΘL)/P (ΘS) and we have assumed mS =
mL (i.e. that the models do not differ in the volume of
spacetime available to normal observers). The last line
follows for large n.
We can neglect nS for nS  nL. Then there are two
interesting limits. If pfnL is small, freak observers are
scarce, and the ‘first-person’ ratio RPΘ is only slightly
smaller than the ‘third-person’ one:
RP |Θ
∣∣
pfnL→0 ' (1− pfnL)RΘ. (79)
This is a slight preference for S models over L ones, but
for pfnL  1 the preference is negligible. The other
limit of interest is when both models have problems with
freak observers because pfnK is large. Then each theory
is deweighted by the factor (1 − pf )nK which goes to 0,
but the factor for L falls much faster and we have,
RP |Θ
∣∣
pfnL→1 ' e
−pfnLRΘ, (80)
strongly favoring S over L. So under the criterion of ‘no
freaks like me’, if there are no models without significant
probability for freak observers, the ones which minimize
the volume for them to spawn are strongly preferred. Of
course any model which has no freak observers would, by
that criterion, be preferred over those.
VIII. GOTT ANALYSIS
J. Richard Gott III wrote about what seems to be an
entirely different kind of observer selection effect [13]. He
argued that simply by knowing how long some finite-
lifetime entity has been observed, one can bound the
probability of it lasting a long time. For example, if you
live at time t after the start of a civilization, his argument
says that simply assuming you are a random observer im-
plies that the probability of the civilization lasting 40t is
only 1/40, or 2.5%.
There are a number of problems with this argument, as
we shall see. The first is that Gott’s analysis did not make
use of a prior [35], which Gott then addressed [36]. This
point was echoed by Carleton Caves [37], who found that
the prior probability for a world having lifetime T needed
to obtain Gott’s result is the Jeffereys prior, which goes
as 1/T . However, as we shall see, this corresponds to a
Pick-selection. The prior needed to obtain the probabil-
ity Gott finds to Be in a civilization lasting time T is not
the Jeffereys prior, but a prior that goes as 1/T 2 [38, 39].
Caves argued that the analysis was also flawed because
it assumed that the observer had to live only during the
timespan of the ‘world’, and that once one relaxes that
assumption, the effect goes away. (This is really about
what set of observer moments it is reasonable for one
to consider that the moment at hand is randomly drawn
from. For Gott’s example of the Berlin wall, one could as-
sert that his observation of the wall was drawn randomly
from possible moments during the existence of the wall
when he could ponder the question of the duration of its
existence, rather than a random moment from his lifetime
that predates and postdates the wall. It is then a ques-
tion of whether that assumption is reasonable. It is cer-
tainly problematic in many cases. For example, it is hard
to argue that the observer moment in which you ponder
the lifetime of an architectural construction is randomly
drawn from all the moments during its existence if you
were born before it was built—for a long-lived construc-
tion you are necessarily seeing only its earliest moments.)
But it should not be a problem in the narrow case of in-
terest to us: where we assign probabilities for the lifetime
of the world in which we were born—we are necessarily
alive only during the world in which we are born, and so
random observer moments in our lifetime are necessarily
within the time window of the world’s existence.
We will first explain the Gott argument in his notation
and then ours. Then we will show how to incorporate
a prior, derive results for different priors, and determine
which one gives Gott’s results. Then we show that Gott’s
results do not actually represent an OSE, and we trace
the source of the effect. Finally, we consider the exclusive
case, where one lifetime is picked.
A. Gott’s argument
Suppose we are a random intelligent observer of some
‘world’ of lifetime T which has existed so far for time t.
We do not know T and we want to know if knowing t tells
us anything about T , other than T ≥ t. Gott gives a few
examples [13], but they are of two types: things on which
our existence does not depend, such as the timespan for
which the Berlin wall existed, and things on which it
does depend, such as the civilization in which we were
born. We will not consider the former further, except
to note that the second critique of Caves may apply to
those situations. Thus, since we assume we live during
the world, we can without loss of generality define Gott’s
quantities as
tbegin → 0
tend → T
tnow → t (81)
tfuture→ Tfut ≡ T − t,
(82)
where we take as a precondition that t is in the range
[0, T ]. This world could refer to our planet (in which
case t ∼ 109 years), the era of homo sapiens (t ∼ 105
years), our civilization (t ∼ 104 years), or civilization
since Bayesian questions like this have been asked (t ∼ 40
years). One could even try to argue that it refers to the
metastable electroweak vacuum (t ∼ 1010). Now, going
back to the original assumption, it is not at all clear that
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we qualify as a random observer in any of these ‘worlds’,
but nevertheless let us assume that we do.
First, Gott argues each value of t in the range [0, T ] is
equally likely. This is true if there is an equal number of
observers at each time t in [0, T ] (unreasonable in most
cases—really t and T are better thought of as the current
and final tally of observers in the world) and one selects
them at random. This can be loosely written,
“P (t) = constant/T.” (83)
Further, this means that t/T is a random number be-
tween 0 and 1, so,
“P (t/T ) = constant.” (84)
Finally, if we sum up the probabilities for our expectation
for the remaining time left for the world, Tfut ≡ T−t, we
obtain that it is overwhelmingly likely to be of roughly
of order t (neither much greater nor smaller than t),
“P (
1
39
t < Tfut < 39t) = 0.95, ” (85)
or focusing on the upper end and using Tfut ≡ T − t to
write this more generally,
“P (T > Kt) = 1/K, ” (86)
where K > 1. Note that for K = 40, we get the proba-
bility of Tfut = T − t being greater than 39t is 1/40, or
2.5%, in agreement with Eq. (85) (the upper and lower
tails are equally probable). Further, note that these are
scale-invariant probabilities: they depend on the ratio
t/T independent of whether the scale is decades or mil-
lennia.
Gott seemingly found a way to argue that our datum
t not only tells us something about our world’s eventual
lifetime T , but argued that T is unlikely to be more than
a few times t, no matter the scale.
Is this right?
B. Our argument
As usual, we have a set of observers P and a set of
worlds W . As Gott does, we will for simplicity assume
that the number of observers at each time is the same.
We will use the compact notation outlined at the end of
Appendix A, i.e.
P (PαWβ) ≡ P (αβ), P (Pα |Wβ) ≡ P (α |β) (87)
where α and β can be ‘null,’ e.g., P (T |t) ≡ P (PWT |PtW )
and P ( |T |t |) ≡ P (P |WT |Pt |W ). Let us then define
the probability density to Be in a world at time t (for a
moment lasting dt):
p(t) ≡ P (P[t,t+dt]W )/dt. (88)
The probability density to Be in a world of lifetime T
(one again needs a finite range [T, T + dT ]), and to Pick
a world of lifetime T are
p(T ) ≡ P (PW[T,T+dT ])/dT, (89)
p( |T ) ≡ P (P |W[T,T+dT ])/dT. (90)
Note that the probability density to Be in a world is
weighted as before by the total number of observers who
will ever live in the world, which by assumption is pro-
portional to T , so,
p(T ) ∼ Tp( |T ). (91)
What we are going to do is start with a prior proba-
bility density for our world having lifetime T , p( |T ), the
likelihood density of being in our world at time t given
that it will exist for time T , p(t|T ), and we will use Bayes’
theorem to calculate the posterior probability density of
our world living time T given our datum t, p(T |t).
The likelihood density is, as Gott said, a constant, in-
dependent of t,
p(t|T ) ≡ P (P[t,t+dt]W |PW[T,T+dT ])/dt = 1
T
. (92)
Note that if we integrate this probability density over all
values of t in [0, T ], P ((0 ≤ t ≤ T )|T ) = ∫ T
0
p(t|T )dt we
get 1. This is essentially the same expression as Eq. (83)
which we used to express Gott’s words, except that here
we are explicitly writing a likelihood density conditioned
on lifetime T .
The key problem with Gott’s analysis is that he jumps
right to a probability for t/T without a prior. Let us
examine three possible priors, and see which gives the
results Gott found. We need the prior probability den-
sity for Picking a world of lifetime T , p( |T ), because
it should contain all factors other than our existence.
This is parallel to what we did in the Prisoner scenario,
though there we needed only probabilities P (WS) and
P (WL), whereas here we need a function of T over its
range. This brings up an important point: we need to
define minimum and maximum plausible values of life-
time T for the world we are in, T− and T+ respectively.
They allow us to properly normalize our expressions, but
T± play a more subtle role too, as we shall see. It must
end up being the case that T+ is greater than both t and
T , and that T− be smaller than T , so if we really tried to
define T± without any idea of the timescales involved, we
might fail in that. And our expectations for the timescale
might change with t. For example, today we might see
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T+ = 10
6 years as reasonable, but if civilization somehow
survives for a million years, that T+ will be too low. This
is less of an issue for T+ because we will be able take it
to infinity in our final expressions. But T− is trickier.
Three reasonable choices for our prior p( |T ), are con-
stant, ∼ 1/T (Jeffereys), and ∼ 1/T 2. The normalized
priors to Pick a world of lifetime T ∈ [T−, T+] are:
p( |T )
∣∣
const
=
1
T+ − T− ,
p( |T )
∣∣
1/T
=
1
T ln (T+/T−)
, (93)
p( |T )
∣∣
1/T 2
=
1
T 2(1/T− − 1/T+) ,
which lead to corresponding probability densities to Be
in such a world (again assuming the number of observers
at each time is constant and Eq. (91)):
p(T )
∣∣
const
=
T
1
2 (T
2
+ − T 2−)
,
p(T )
∣∣
1/T
=
1
T+ − T− , (94)
p(T )
∣∣
1/T 2
=
1
T ln (T+/T−)
.
Next we plug the likelihood density p(t|T ) in Eq. (92)
and our Be priors p(T ) in Eq. (94) into Bayes’ theorem,
p(T |t) = p(t|T )p(T )
p(t)
. (95)
We can calculate p(t) by integrating p(t|T )p(T )dT over
T . We need to be a little careful about the limits of in-
tegration because we have defined T ≥ t and T ≥ T−,
but at the moment it is ambiguous whether t is greater
than T− or not. So let us define the lower limit on T to
be the maximum of the two: tm ≡ max (t, T−). For the
three different priors, we obtain three posterior probabil-
ity densities for T ∈ [tm, T+]:
p(T |t)∣∣
const
=
1
T+ − tm →∼ constant,
p(T |t)∣∣
1/T
=
1
T ln (T+/tm)
→∼ 1
T
, (96)
p(T |t)∣∣
1/T 2
=
1
T 2(1/tm − 1/T+) →
tm
T 2
,
where the righthand side is the limit where T+ → ∞.
Note that these are the same expressions as the priors in
Eq. (93) with T− replaced by tm. In other words, the
only effect of the datum here is the trivial replacement
of the lower bound on T because it is necessarily at least
equal to t. So if we quantify the OSE by taking the ratio
of the posterior to the prior,
RT ≡ p(T |t)
p( |T )
, (97)
we obtain for the three priors,
RT
∣∣
const
=
T+ − T−
T+ − tm → 1,
RT
∣∣
1/T
=
ln (T+/T−)
ln (T+/tm)
→ 1, (98)
RT
∣∣
1/T 2
=
1/T− − 1/T+
1/tm − 1/T+ →
tm
T−
,
where again the righthand side is for T+ → ∞. In that
limit, the first two priors yield RT = 1 even if we include
the replacement effect of T− → tm. To evaluate the third
prior, we need to discuss the value of tm. There are three
possible values:
• t < T−, so tm = T−, and our lower bound on T
does not increase.
• t = T−, so tm = t = T−, and our lower bound on T
does not increase.
• t > T−, so tm = t, and our lower bound on T does
increase.
The first case means that prior to our using our datum t
we assumed that the minimum value of T was larger, as-
serting that there is zero probability for our world to end
between now, t, and T−. The third case means that prior
to taking note of t, we thought that the lower bound on
T was T−, and so datum updates our knowledge, raising
that lower bound—yet somehow we are still confident
in our prior assumed probability density despite being
wrong about its endpoint. The second case strikes us
as the most reasonable, because we should already know
that T− ≥ t and cannot know that T− > t, so we should
assume T− = t. Nevertheless, let us consider all three
cases.
For the first two cases, t ≤ T−, all three priors lead to
RT = 1. For t > T− and the 1/T 2 prior, RT = t/T−,
which is > 1. This is an upward shift due to the fact that
the posterior probability density is nonzero over a smaller
range, [t, T+], than the prior probability density [T−, T+].
We will call this a ‘boundary condition OSE’. It is not
due to the number of elements in the set of observers, P ,
as in OSEs we considered previously. Rather, it is simply
due to raising the lower bound on T from T− to t.
So, given that there is only at best a boundary condi-
tion OSE here, can we reproduce Gott’s result? We can.
To compare to Gott’s result, we have to integrate these
functions of T from Kt to T+ for fixed t (and assume
Kt ∈ [T−, T+]). This yields probabilities for T in the
range of Kt to T+:
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P (T > Kt|t)∣∣
const
=
T+ −Kt
T+ − tm → 1,
P (T > Kt|t)∣∣
1/T
=
ln (T+/Kt)
ln (T+/tm)
→ 1, (99)
P (T > Kt|t)∣∣
1/T 2
=
1
K
tm
t
T+ −Kt
T+ − tm →
1
K
tm
t
,
where we again take the limit that T+ →∞. We see that
for the constant and Jeffereys priors, the probability of
T > Kt goes to 1. This is not surprising; if we assume the
maximum on T is much greater than Kt, the probability
that T > Kt approaches 1, unless our prior falls very
fast. For the prior p( |T ) ∼ 1/T 2 it does fall fast enough.
If t ≥ T− then tm = t so that
P (T > Kt|t)|1/T 2, t≥T− →
1
K
, (100)
and we have obtained Gott’s expression in Eq. (86). (For
t < T−, this integrated probability is larger. We shall see
what that means shortly.)
So even though there is only a boundary-condition
OSE, we have reproduced the result of Gott, seemingly
disfavoring long-term worlds. How is that possible?
C. Why does Gott seem to find an OSE?
To answer this, consider the situation before we know
datum t and where we Pick a world at random. We know
by assumption that with probability 1, T ∈ [T−, T+] (in-
tegrate p( |T ) from T− to T+ and we get 1). Suppose we
ask what the probability is for this world to last K times
its minimum, i.e., for T > KT−. We simply integrate
p( |T ) from KT− to T+. This gives
P ( |(T > KT−))
∣∣
1/T 2
=
1
K
T+ −KT−
T+ − T− →
1
K
. (101)
For fixed KT− and T+ → ∞ this gives 1/K! In other
words, the effect that Gott found has nothing to do with
the datum t, but just the rapidly falling prior to which
his result corresponds.
Still, it is useful to define a metric which manifestly
shows that there is no OSE. For that, let us define the
ratio of probability densities integrated over T . Dividing
Eqs. (99) by (101) we see that for the 1/T 2 prior,
R∫ T
∣∣∣
1/T 2
≡ P (T > Kt|t)
P ( |(T > KT−))
∣∣∣∣∣
1/T 2
=
tm
t
. (102)
For t ≥ T−, the cases where we obtained Gott’s result,
we see that this equals 1—that the posterior probability
is the same as we obtained using the prior lower bound,
and there is no OSE of any kind. For the case t < T− this
ratio is larger than 1 (note that the righthand side cannot
exceed K because if Kt < T− then P (T > Kt|t) = 1).
What that means is that from our prior, we assumed
that large T worlds were disfavored, but upon learning
that t < T−, our expectation is less negative due to not
having reached the lower bound in the world’s lifetime,
T−.
So in the inclusive case, there is no 1/T OSE. For a
fast falling prior we can obtain Gott’s 1/K result, but
it is not an OSE either, just a manifestation of the fast-
falling prior we assumed. The only OSE that remains
in any of these cases is if we assumed a fast-falling 1/T 2
prior, thinking that worlds with T > KT− were very
unlikely, but then finding out that t < T−, making our
posterior probability less dire than our prior.
D. Picking hypothesis T
Suppose that instead of Being in a set of worlds of
various lifetimes T , we assert that there is precisely one
world, with one future, one lifetime T∗, and we have a
set of hypotheses ΘT for what T∗ is. This is an exclusive
case, and we are interested in the posterior probability
density,
p( |T |t |) ≡ P (P |Θ[T,T+dT ]|P[t,t+dt] |Θ)/dT
=
p(t -| -T )p( |T )
p(t |)
. (103)
The key difference from our analysis above is that the
prior that goes into Bayes’ theorem is the Pick probabil-
ity density p( |T ) instead of the Be probability density
p(T ) (and the corresponding denominator p(t |)). The
likelihood is not affected, as in the Warden case, because
the Pick is neutered. The upshot is that the posterior
probabilities go as ∼ 1/T times those in the Be case in
Eq. (96),
p( |T |t |)∣∣
const
=
1
T ln (T+/tm)
→∼ 1
T
,
p( |T |t |)∣∣
1/T
=
tm
T 2
T+
T+ − tm →
tm
T 2
, (104)
which means there is an OSE for this pick-a-hypothesis-
T∗:
R |T ≡
p( |T |t |)
p( |T )
→∼ 1
T
. (105)
Specifically,
R |T
∣∣
const
=
1
T
T+ − T−
ln (T+/tm)
→∼ 1
T
,
R |T
∣∣
1/T
=
1
T
ln (T+/T−)
1/tm − 1/T+ →∼
tm
T
. (106)
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But as with RT , R |T is not an ideal metric of OSE, so
we should consider the probabilities resulting from inte-
grating over T :
P ( |(T > Kt)|t |)
∣∣∣
const
=
ln (T+/Kt)
ln (T+/tm)
→ 1, (107)
P ( |(T > Kt)|t |)
∣∣∣
1/T
=
1
K
tm
t
T+ −Kt
T+ − tm →
1
K
tm
t
,
and we obtain the same 1/K expression as Gott, now for
the 1/T prior and T− = t (the expression is the same as
the Gott case, but his description of the problem seems
like a Be, and thus corresponds to Eq. (100)).
As we did in the Be case, we define an OSE metric as
the ratio of integrated probability densities,
R∫ |T ≡ P ( |(T > Kt)|t |)P ( |(T > KT−)) , (108)
which yields for the two priors we consider here,
R∫ |T
∣∣∣
const
→ 1,
R∫ |T
∣∣∣
1/T
→ 1
K
tm
t
. (109)
What this means is that there is a true OSE in the
t ≥ T− Pick case for the 1/T prior which manifests itself
as a factor of 1/K in that ratio of the integrated pos-
terior to prior probability densities. In other words, the
posterior probability density falls with T faster than the
prior probability density due to an OSE, which manifests
itself in R∫ |T being smaller than one. If t < T− this is
mitigated by the T−/t factor, and is completely erased if
Kt < T−, yielding R∫ |T = 1.
For the constant prior case, there is an OSE in the ra-
tio of probability densities (R |T ∼ 1/T ) but it is washed
out when one integrates over T (the posterior probabil-
ity density falls faster with T than the prior probability
density, but both fall slowly enough that their integrated
probabilities go to 1, hence their ratio, R∫ |T , is also 1).
So in the exclusive case there is a real OSE, but only
if the prior falls fast enough and t is not much less than
T−.
IX. DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT
We are now finally ready to discuss the Doomsday ar-
gument. The question is,
Do observer selection effects increase the
probability that our world will be short-lived?
First, this is a very strange thing to ask. This would
entail laying out all the factors which we might use to
assign a probability for the world ending soon, and sep-
arate out the datum of what year it is. But all of the
factors are intertwined. For the purpose of the argument
below, we need to make the somewhat unreasonable as-
sumption that we can put all factors (e.g., our estimate
for the probability of nuclear war) other than that da-
tum into some prior—which is somewhat unreasonable
because such a calculation usually depends on temporal
information (e.g., the survival probability per year was
surely lower in the early days of nuclear weapons than at
other times). In any case, we make this assumption for
the arguments below.
As it is usually stated, the question is whether the
probability that we live in a short-lived world (world type
S) or a long-lived one (world type L) is changed given
the information about the date (datum d). Clearly this
is a Be selection—we are born in this world without the
need for that world to be picked. So the zeroth order
analysis is that the case is like our very first example, the
Prisoner Problem, where there was no OSE, and thus no
Doomsday effect. The posterior probability of being in
a short-lived world is just given by Eq. (6), and equals
the prior probability of picking such a world, so that the
ratio of posterior probabilities to their priors, RP/W , is
one:
P (PWS |PdW )= P (WS), (110)
RP/W= 1. (111)
But we need to be careful just what our assumptions
are regarding any larger sets PW are embedded in. For
example, if we treat the world types as mutually exclusive
hypotheses for short-lived and long-lived worlds, ΘS and
ΘL, then there is a Pick at that level and there is an OSE
akin to that in Eq. (10),
P (PW |ΘS |PdW |Θ)= P (WS)
P (WS) +
1
ρP (WL)
, (112)
R
|Θ
P/W=
1
ρ
. (113)
Note that here we are saying that either hypothesis ΘS
or ΘL is realized, but not both. This is reasonable only
if one assumes that there is only one relevant planet (the
Earth) because there are no relevant exoplanets (we are
not asking about the inhabitants of inhabitable worlds,
just of the Earth), nor copies of the Earth nor multi-
ple futures of this one Earth (in a partial or complete
multiverse of some sort, such as in unitary quantum me-
chanics). Again, there is an OSE given these assumptions
because we are saying that there are multiple hypotheses
(ΘS and ΘL), but only one of them can be realized.
This also assumes that we are typical observers. This,
too, can depend on assumptions or on how the problem
is stated. For example, by saying that you are equally
likely to be any human throughout history fails to take
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into account the fact that only a tiny fraction of humans
throughout history might have asked the Doomsday ques-
tion, at least as stated. For example, humans before 1763
could not have phrased a question in terms of Bayes’ The-
orem [40], and the question “will our civilization last until
the year 2500?” will become moot in 500 years. Simi-
larly, the question “will our civilization last another 100
years?” changes character as the centuries we survive ac-
crue, since a century becomes a smaller and smaller frac-
tion of the civilization’s lifetime. We need to phrase the
question in such a way that it would be just as reasonable
for a current and future inhabitant of the civilization to
ask it.
We argue that the question framed by Gott is actually
best, because “will our world last K times its present
age?” is somewhat timescale invariant. There are still is-
sues with assigning a starting point for the world, and a
prior probability density for a world of lifetime T , p( |T )
(e.g., neglecting the problem of lumping all other factors
into the prior in a time-independent way), but at least it
is reasonable for future observers to ask that same ques-
tion.
So, to be specific, we should ask whether the current
age of our world, t, should affect our estimate for the
lifetime of the world, T . As we discussed in Section VIII
the selection in PW is a Be, and there is just a boundary
condition OSE: the effect of replacing the lower bound on
T , T−, with t, for t > T−. We further argued that it is not
reasonable to have chosen T− either greater or smaller
than t, and that for T− = t, the prior and posterior
probability densities are equal, so there is no OSE at all:
p(T |t)∣∣
T−=t
= p( |T ) =⇒ RT
∣∣
T−=t
= 1. (114)
We then integrate these probability densities over T to
obtain the probability of Being in a world with T > Kt
given t. As we said in Section VIII this goes to 1 unless
the prior falls quickly, see Eq. (99). Even in the case of
such a fast falling prior, the 1/K effect is not an OSE,
but just an artifact of that prior. We quantified that by
taking the ratio of integrated probabilities in Eq. (102),
R∫ T ∣∣T−=t = 1, (115)
which shows that there is no OSE at all in the Be case.
Is there any somewhat reasonable set of assumptions
which leads to a Doomsday effect? Yes. If we assert, as
we did in Section VIII D, that there is a unique lifetime
for the world, T∗, and we have hypotheses T for what
that T∗ is, then there is a Pick on the nested set, P |Θ,
and there is an OSE given by Eq. (105):
p( |T |t |) ∼ 1
T
p( |T ) =⇒ R |T ∼
1
T
. (116)
But even then, if we choose a constant prior probability
density p( |T ), the posterior probability that the world
will last K times longer than it has so far, goes to one as
in Eq. (107). However, if we start with a 1/T prior, the
OSE is not washed out in Eq. (107), and the OSE sur-
vives in the ratio of integrated probabilities, Eq. (109):
R∫ |T
∣∣∣
1/T, T−=t
→ 1
K
. (117)
This is a Doomsday effect. It says that given the as-
sumptions above, even if we include our timescale in set-
ting the minimum lifetime (T− = t), and integrate our
probability densities over T , and normalize to that inte-
grated probability for the prior, there is an OSE in the
Pick case for a falling prior—that our datum t, by itself,
should cause us to reduce our posterior probability that
our world will last substantially longer than it has.
So, in summary, there can be a Doomsday effect, but
to have one requires a set of assumptions like this:
• All factors other than the current age of the world,
t, can be separated out into a prior, which is a
simple function of the world’s lifetime T .
• You are typical of observers throughout the lifetime
of the world, including in what question is being
asked.
• There is exactly one true value of the lifetime, T∗,
because you consider only one world with one fixed
future—so you view the values of T to be mutually
exclusive hypotheses for the value of T∗, resulting in
a Pick. It is not enough to assume an exclusiverse,
it has to a be universe with only one manifestation
of the world so that there is only one true lifetime
T∗.
• The prior probability density falls as a function of
T so that the integration over T does not wash out
the OSE.
Absent a set of assumptions like these, there is no Dooms-
day effect. All of these strike us as somewhat unreason-
able, except the last. Thus, one can probably not argue
that our ‘world’, be it the era of Bayesian reasoning or
of the stable electroweak vacuum, is doomed to end soon
on the basis of datum t.
X. UNIVERSAL DOOMSDAY ARGUMENT
In addition to the Doomsday argument, which con-
cerns our world, some authors have discussed a ‘Universal
Doomsday’ argument [10, 11], which says that not only
does our datum imply that our world is doomed to die
sooner than our priors for its lifetime, due to some OSE,
but that all worlds are also doomed to die out sooner
due to our datum. Some authors argue that ‘Universal
Doomsday’ can occur even when the Doomsday effect is
not present. This cannot be. If there is a Doomsday
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effect due to a temporal datum, that lowered posterior
probability can affect our posterior probability for the
lifetimes of other worlds, but it should be clear that if
there is no Doomsday effect, if we gain no information
from our datum about our own world, our posteriors for
other worlds must be unchanged as well.
What we are interested in is how the datum affects an
ensemble of worlds, E, as we consider in the inclusive
and exclusive cases of Sections IV and V. In particular,
here are the posterior probability densities for ensembles
of type y given datum d, in the inclusive case where there
is no Doomsday effect, and in the exclusive case where
there can be one:
p(y|d) ≡ P (PWE[y,y+dy]|PdWE)/dy, (118)
p( |y|d |) ≡ P (PW |E[y,y+dy]|PdW |E)/dy. (119)
We ask whether these differ from the prior probability
density for y,
p( |y) ≡ P (PW |E[y,y+dy])/dy. (120)
Universal Doomsday is the claim that it does. If the
probability distribution function for y changes, so does
our estimate for the average fraction y of worlds of type
S. Our prior estimate is the average of y weighted by the
prior p( |y),
〈y〉 ≡
∫ 1
0
y p( |y)dy. (121)
After taking our datum d into account, our posterior es-
timates for that average in the inclusive and exclusive
cases are weighted by the posterior probability distribu-
tion functions p(y|d) and p( |y|d |), respectively,
〈y〉d ≡
∫ 1
0
y p(y|d)dy, (122)
〈y〉d | ≡
∫ 1
0
y p( |y|d |)dy. (123)
For reasons that will become clear in a moment, let’s
define metrics for Universal Doomsday,
RUDW ≡
1− 〈y〉
〈y〉 ,
R
( |)UD
P ≡
1− 〈y〉d( |)
〈y〉d( |)
, (124)
R
( |)UD
P/W ≡
R
( |)UD
P
RUDW
,
where the “ |” is there in the exclusive case but not the
inclusive case.
It turns out we have already come across these aver-
ages. The prior average fraction 〈y〉 in Eq. (121) is equal
to the prior probability of worlds of type S:
P (WS
|E) =
∫ 1
0
P (WS
-E|W -Ey)p(W |Ey)dy
=
∫ 1
0
y p( |y)dy = 〈y〉 . (125)
Note that if we assume that N¯y/N¯ = 1, i.e. that the
ensembles differ only by fraction of worlds type S, y, not
their number, then p(WS
|E) = p(WSE), so that this is
the prior probability of worlds of type S in both the ex-
clusive and inclusive cases. What about 〈y〉d and 〈y〉d |?
They turn out to be simply equal to the posterior prob-
abilities for being in an S world, given datum d, in the
inclusive and exclusive cases, respectively:
P ( P WSE|PdWE)
=
∫ 1
0
P (PWSE|PdWEy)p(PdWEy|PdWE)dy
=
∫ 1
0
y p(y|d)dy = 〈y〉d , (126)
P ( P WS
|E|PdW |E)
=
∫ 1
0
P (PWS
-E|PdW -Ey)p(PdW |Ey|PdW |E)dy
=
∫ 1
0
y p( |y|d |)dy = 〈y〉d | . (127)
These are just the expressions for the posterior probabil-
ities for worlds of type S. In fact we see that,
p(y|d) = p( |y),
p( |y|d |) = p(
|y)
y + (1− y)ρ . (128)
Thus, we see that the metrics for Universal Doomsday
are exactly the same as for Doomsday,
RUDW = R
( |)E
W ,
R
( |)UD
P = R
( |)E
P , (129)
R
( |)UD
P/W = R
( |)E
P/W .
In the inclusive case, 〈y〉d = 〈y〉, REP = REW , and
REP/W = 1 for both Doomsday and Universal Dooms-
day. So one cannot have one without the other. For the
exclusive case, 〈y〉d | 6= 〈y〉, and R
|E
P 6= R
|E
W , but the val-
ues for these metrics and R
|E
P/W for Universal Doomsday
and Doomsday are the same. There is a fundamental
reason for this: any Doomsday effect, from our data on
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being in a world selected from ensemble E, can be writ-
ten as a Universal Doomsday change in our weighting of
the ensemble, i.e., taking p( |y) → p(( |)y|d( |)). So Uni-
versal Doomsday and Doomsday are two different ways
of expressing the same effect, or lack thereof.
XI. SLEEPING BEAUTY PROBLEM
Let us apply what we have learned to an observer
thought experiment called the ‘Sleeping Beauty Prob-
lem’ [41], which has generated disagreement to the point
that philosophers have separated into two camps called
‘Halfers’ [42–44] and ‘Thirders’ [41, 45–47]:
Suppose Sleeping Beauty is put to sleep on Sunday. She
is woken on Monday, questioned, then put back to sleep,
and all her memories of that day are deleted. A fair coin
is flipped. If it lands tails, she is also woken on Tuesday,
and again questioned, put back to sleep and her memory
deleted. If it lands heads, she is not woken on Tuesday.
In either case she awakes on Wednesday after the experi-
ment concludes. Beauty is aware of all of the above. She
is asked each time she is woken for the probability that
the coin flip results in “heads.”
So-called Halfers argue that she should answer “1/2”
(each time) because it is a fair coin and she learns noth-
ing from being awakened, and the question is the same
as “what is the probability you are in a heads world?”
(i.e. a world where the coin landed heads). So-called
Thirders argue that she should say “1/3” because there is
one observer moment associated with a head flip, which
we will call Mon-H, and there are two associated with
tails, Mon-T and Tue-T , and the question is effectively
the same as “what is the probability you are in a heads
observer moment?” There are a number of other papers
advocating one side or the other, but none of them spec-
ify whether the situation corresponds to inclusive or ex-
clusive selection, which we will see is key. A number of
authors assume the SIA, which as we have pointed out
is an unfortunate kludge that leads to the Presumptuous
Philosopher problem. All authors seem to argue that if
Beauty learns that it is Monday, her estimate for “heads”
should go up. As we will see, that is not always true.
There are also arguments about what wagers she should
be willing to accept and whether that reasoning should
affect her probability estimate, which we address at the
end of the section.
For our formalism, we need two sets. We need a set of
worlds, W = {WH ,WT }, in which the coin came up H or
T . For a fair coin, the probability of picking each world
is the same: P (WH) = P (WT ) = 1/2. Nested inside W
is the set, P , of Sleeping Beauty observer moments, P =
PMon,H ∪ PMon,T ∪ PTue,T = {Mon-H, Mon-T, Tue-T},
where the first element belongs to PH (which is nested
in WH), and the other two to PT (nested in WT ). If
Beauty does not know the day, all three of these observer
moments are indistinguishable to her.
First, let’s look at Beauty’s viewpoint within the inclu-
sive case. The probability that she should assign for the
coin coming up heads within the world associated with
her observer moment is given by the Be probability for a
heads observer moment,
P (PWH |PW ) = P (PH) = n,H
n
=
1
3
. (130)
That is, in the inclusive case “she” is in all three observer
moments, only one of which is a heads observer moment.
If she learns the day is Monday, the set of observer
moments is [PMon] instead of P , and her probability for
“heads” increases because “she” could be in only two
Monday observer moments:
P ([PMon]WH | [PMon]W ) = [nMon],H
[nMon]
=
1
2
. (131)
Thus, in the inclusive case, learning that it is Monday
does increase her probability estimate that the coin came
up heads, and both of these probabilities correspond to
those of the Thirder camp.
Next, let’s look at Beauty’s viewpoint with exclusive
selection. If she does not know the day, her probability
estimate is the same as that of an outside observer, such
as the coin flipper, where a single world (coin flip) result
is Picked first:
P (P |WH |P |W ) = P (WH) = 1
2
. (132)
In other words, if she assumes there is one world, it has
a 1/2 chance of being an H-world, and her being awake
in an observer moment and not knowing the day brings
her no new information. This is the Halfer point of view.
Now, suppose she learns it is a Monday. One might
think that this information should increase her credence
in “heads”. And in fact, if you were to Pick a single
recording of a random day in the experiment (Mon-H
in an H-world, Mon-T or Tue-T in a T -world), and the
recording turned out to be from a Monday, you should
increase your credence that the coin came up heads, as
the Halfer camp claims,
P (“Record Picked= Mon-H ”|“Mon”) =
P (P |WH |PMon |W ) =
P (PMon
-W |P -WH)P (WH)
P (PMon |W |P |W ) =
P (WH)∑
F={H,T} P (PMon,F |P,F )P (WF )
=
1/2
1/2 + 1/4
=
2
3
, (133)
but that’s not what Beauty does. Instead, if the coin
comes up tails, she experiences both Mon-T and Tue-T ,
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so the fact that one of them is on a Monday adds no new
information. In our formalism, the way to see this is that
the set of observer moments is [PMon] instead of P , and
her estimate for the probability of heads is just,
P ([PMon]
|WH | [PMon] |W ) = P (WH) = 1
2
. (134)
So if Beauty assumes exclusive selection, learning that
it is Monday does not increase her credence that she is
in an H-world because she is sure to experience a Mon-
day whatever the coin flip. (The reader might note that
if Beauty learns that it is a Tuesday, she should assign
zero probability to H, but that fact does not affect her
probability for H in the case where she learns it is Mon-
day because in a tails world ‘she’ experiences both days.)
This is good, because if she knows it is a Monday, then
the amnesia drug is irrelevant, it is the same situation if
you ask anyone what the odds a fair coin will come up
heads, and there had better be no difference between in-
clusive and exclusive selection: they both conclude that
the probability of heads is 1/2, as they do in Eqs. (131)
and (134).
Now, it is interesting to consider what happens if we
run the experiment multiple times, once a week for w
weeks. We will assume she does not know the day, so the
amnesia drug does matter. If Beauty knows the week,
she can treat each of the w experiments like a copy of the
original experiment, and she should come to the Thirder
(Halfer) probability in the inclusive (exclusive) case. If
she does not know the week, the inclusive probability
is unchanged, but something interesting happens in the
exclusive case: we get the result Nick Bostrom calls a
‘hybrid model’ [48].
In this exclusive situation, there is one fixed set of coin
flips F = {F1, F2, ...Fw} which actually occurs. The set
of worlds can be broken into 2w subsets specifying exactly
one flip, such as WF1 , where the coin in week 1 came up
heads for F1 = H1 and tails for F1 = T1, and we do
not specify what happened in the other weeks. We can
also break W down into subsets with the flips in multiple
weeks specified, including the 2w subsets where they are
all specified: WF1F2...Fw . There is a third way to partition
the set W , by the total number of heads, h, in set F ,
Wh. If w = 1, we have P (P
|WH1) = 1/2 because she is
in either WH1 or WT1 with equal probability. But, if w >
1, although she reasons she can experience exactly one
sequence of coin flips, e.g., {H1, T2}, she also reasons that
in that world she should lump observer moment Mon1-
H1 with Mon2-T2 and Tue2-T2, since she has no way
to tell them apart. So for sequences with half the flips
heads, h = w/2, she will come up with a probability of
1/3 for the coin having been heads in a given observer
moment. For a sequence with a total of h heads out of
w flips, the probability of her being in a heads observer
moment is h/(h+2(w−h)). Thus she just needs to weight
this probability by the probability that the sequence that
occurs has h heads, P (Wh), which is
1
2w
(
w
h
)
:
P ((P1
|WH1) ∨ ...(Pw |WHw)|P |W )
=
w∑
h=0
P ((P1
|WH1) ∨ ...(Pw |WHw)|P |Wh)P (Wh)
=
w∑
h=0
h
h+ 2(w − h)
1
2w
(
w
h
)
. (135)
For w = 1, this is 1/2, for w = 2 it is 5/12, which
is midway between 1/2 and 1/3, and for w = 10, the
probability of heads drops to about 0.35. For larger and
larger w,P (Wh) is approximately a narrower and nar-
rower Gaussian centered on h = w/2, and the probabil-
ity for Beauty’s heads observer moments gets closer and
closer to 1/3. In other words, exclusive selection with
a large number of indistinguishable trials becomes indis-
tinguishable from inclusive selection.
Let us consider what happens if we ask Beauty to wa-
ger on whether the coin will come up heads or tails. Can
she distinguish whether she is in a reality that corre-
sponds to the inclusive or exclusive case? The answer is
“no”, because they lead to the same result, though for
seemingly different reasons. Suppose she is offered x:1
odds that the coin landed heads. We will consider the
cases where she bets at every awakening, or only on Mon-
days. First, consider how Beauty would see the situation
on Wednesday, after the experiment is over. Whether
she is in the inclusive or exclusive case, she calculates
that she has a 1/2 chance of being in a world where the
coin came up heads and she won x on Monday, and a
1/2 chance of being in a world where the coin came up
tails and she lost 1 on both Monday and Tuesday, so she
calculates her average winnings to be,
∆ =
1
2
(x− 2). (136)
Thus, she will break even (∆ = 0) if she is given 2:1 odds.
If the betting occurs only on Mondays, then, whether she
is in the inclusive or exclusive case, she calculates that she
has a 1/2 chance of being in a world where the coin came
up heads and she won x on Monday, and a 1/2 chance
of being in a world where the coin came up tails and
she lost 1 on Monday. Thus Beauty after the experiment
calculates her average winnings on Mondays to be,
∆Mon =
1
2
(x− 1), (137)
and she will break even (∆Mon = 0) on Monday bets if
she is given even money, 1:1 odds.
How can her winnings be the same for the inclusive
or exclusive case when her credence for heads differs for
them (if she does not know the day)? If she assumes she
is in the exclusive case, then her reasoning during the
experiment is exactly the same as afterwards. She has a
1/2 chance of being in a world where the coin comes up
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heads and she wins x on Monday, and a 1/2 chance of
being in a world where the coin comes up tails and she
loses 1 on both Monday and Tuesday. Thus she calculates
her winnings for betting each day (on Mondays) to be Eq.
(136) (Eq. (137)). The exclusive case and Wednesday
results are the same because they both refer to head and
tail worlds.
If she assumes she is in an inclusive case, then
“she” is in all three of the observer moments,
{Mon-H, Mon-T, Tue-T}, and so if she bets in each,
her winnings per observer moment are,
∆moment =
1
3
(x− 2). (138)
and if she bets only on the two Monday moments, then
her winnings per observer moment are,
∆momentMon =
1
2
(x− 1). (139)
But to compare apples to apples, we need to know what
she thinks the winnings per world will be, which just
changes the normalization factor for Eq. (138) by the
number of observer moments per world, which is 3/2:
∆ = 32∆
moment = 12 (x − 2). For the Monday case, the
number of observer moments and worlds is the same, so
∆Mon = ∆
moment
Mon =
1
2 (x−1), and we again get Eq. (136-
137).
So an inclusive Beauty calculates the same winnings
per world as an exclusive Beauty. Inclusive Beauty needs
2:1 odds to break even because she wins in only one ob-
server moment out of three. Exclusive Beauty needs 2:1
odds to break even because although she has a 1/2 proba-
bility of a heads world picked out by the coin flip, when-
ever she is in a tails world she loses twice. What this
means is that there is no practical difference between the
inclusive and exclusive case in this thought experiment,
and no way to tell them apart.
The question, “what credence do you assign to heads?”
has answer “1/3” if Beauty sees herself as being in all
three observer moments, and “1/2” if she sees herself as
living in an H-world or a T -world. So, in the end, the
only difference between inclusive Beauty (Thirder posi-
tion) and exclusive Beauty (Halfer position) is that the
former sees ‘herself’ in all three observer moments with
equal probability, and the latter sees ‘herself’ in one of
two worlds with equal probability. For the Halfer, the
person in Mon-T and Tue-T is the same, a temporal con-
tinuation of one being, but not the same person as Mon-
H because they are mutually exclusive timelines. For the
Thirder, all three observer moments correspond to the
same person, an inclusive viewpoint. Neither of these is
inherently right or wrong, it is a matter of how we de-
fine ‘self’— we do not give an answer about which camp
is right because they are each right given a reasonable
set of assumptions. We can analyze the problem with
either definition, but there is no physical difference be-
tween them, as shown by the identical betting odds for
the Halfer and Thirder viewpoints.
Note that one can rephrase the single-run Sleeping
Beauty Problem as several equivalent problems, such as
the Sailor’s Child Problem [49], but the answer is the
same: for the inclusive case the probability is 1/3, and
for the exclusive case it is 1/2, and there is no way to tell
them apart with betting.
Finally, it is possible to construct a similar Gedanken-
experiment where betting can distinguish between inclu-
sive and exclusive cases. Motivated by Nick Bostrom’s
Incubator problem [7], Scott Aaronson suggests the fol-
lowing scenario [16]: If a fair coin comes up heads, Beauty
H-One is cloned into existence; if tails Beauties T-One
and T-Two are cloned into existence. If you find yourself
to be one of these people, what odds would you need to
bet that the coin comes up heads? One needs to be extra
careful when observers are created like this. In the exclu-
sive case, if H, then you are H-One and you win x; if T
you are either T-One or T-Two, and you lose 1, so x = 1,
you are willing to take 1:1 odds. For the inclusive case,
you need to specify your assumptions about personhood.
H-One wins x, and T-One and T-Two each lose 1, but
which of them are ‘you’? Here are three possibilities:
1. You are exactly one of the three. You have 1/3
chance of winning x and 2/3 chance of losing 1, so
x = 2, you need 2:1 odds.
2. You are one person each world. If heads you are
H-One, if tails you are one of T-One or T-Two.
You have 1/2 chance of winning x and 1/2 chance
of losing 1, so x = 1, you need 1:1 odds.
3. You are all three. You have 1/3 chance of winning
x and 2/3 chance of losing 1, so x = 2, you need
2:1 odds.
So with the first and the third assumptions, the inclusive
case differs from the exclusive one, whereas it does not for
the second assumption. As we have stressed throughout
this work, carefully specifying assumptions is crucial.
XII. HEURISTIC SUMMARY AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
We fully recognize that some readers interested in the
topic of observer selection effects (OSE) are not used to
as much math as we used. To that end, we provide a
heuristic summary of our main results. We end by point-
ing to some directions in which this line of research may
proceed.
Our central goal was to study the claim that there is
a Doomsday effect—that by taking into account one’s
temporal location in a world, that datum leads one to
conclude that the world will end sooner than one oth-
erwise would have thought. Along the way, we built the
26
tools needed to investigate that claim, laid out arguments
about when the Doomsday effect holds, and discussed re-
lated issues, such as the problems in cosmology due to
Boltzmann brains.
Throughout the paper, we discussed probabilities of
selecting ‘people’ from some set P . Usually the people
were the observers in the problem. The key distinguish-
ing element about whether there is an OSE or not is if
the selection is a Pick or a Be—whether one first picks
a ‘world’ that the person belongs to, or whether no such
picking is needed because the person just is in the world.
In Section II, we explored the latter via the Prisoner
Problem. If you are a prisoner in a cell, no one has to
select that cell, or cellblock, or prison, for you to experi-
ence an observer moment there. You just are there. As
a result, you are more likely to Be in a cellblock type
L, which has more prisoners than a cellblock of type S,
and that effect exactly cancels the effect of learning rank
information d, which would otherwise favor you in being
in a cellblock type S (see the left half of Fig. 1).
Contrast that to Section III, where we considered the
Warden Problem, where a warden has to pick a cellblock
before selecting a prisoner. This is the way things usually
work when not selecting observers: when the entity being
selected is in an enclosing set, such as a prisoner in a cell
within a cellblock, to select them one has to pick the
outer set, such as the cellblock, first. The effect of this
Pick is to nullify the counteracting effect, seen in the Be
case, due to the number of prisoners. The result is that
the rank information d does tell you that if you are picked
by the warden, you are more likely to be in a cellblock
type S (see the right half of Fig. 1).
Actually, to be more precise, the issue is whether there
is any selection beyond the one needed on the innermost
(leftmost, in our notation) set, and not whether that se-
lection is a Be or Pick. If the selection on the leftmost set
is the only one, we call it inclusive selection. If there is
a selection on one or more of the enclosing sets, then we
call it exclusive selection. In most of the inclusive cases
we considered the selection of the innermost set was a Be.
This is unsurprising, because in order to physically select
elements of a set within some set of ‘worlds’, one usu-
ally must pick the ‘world’ (urn, cellblock, civilization...)
first. (We did give a counter-example, the Warden Cafe-
teria Problem, where the warden directly picks a prisoner
in the cafeteria, circumventing the enclosing set W (the
prisoners are still labeled by the ‘world’ that they belong
to, just not constrained to be selected via that world).
And it is also possible to have a Be-selection on a set
other than the leftmost set by making P an enclosing set
for some other set which the observer picks from, and
then the situation will necessarily be exclusive.)
We then explored the concepts of inclusive and exclu-
sive selection by extending our analysis of the Prisoner
Problem to the largest physical enclosing set in the prob-
lem, which we call E. For our problem, this corresponds
to a set of prisons containing various fractions of S and
L cellblocks. In the inclusive case (Section IV), the only
selection is on the leftmost set (a Be-selection of set P ).
We then considered exclusive selection (Section V), where
there is selection on E in addition to the Be-selection on
P . As in the Prisoner Problem, we found that there is
no OSE in the inclusive case. In the exclusive case, there
is an OSE, but its magnitude depends on our prior as-
sumptions. One can find effects which range from nearly
no OSE to an OSE as large as in the Warden case (see
Fig. 2). The larger the differential between the choices
one picks from, the larger the OSE. We can generalize E
to comprise ‘everything’, a set of all possible universes.
Inclusive selection then corresponds to the inclusiverse,
that we also later called a complete multiverse, which
simply means that we assume all possibilities are real-
ized. Exclusive selection corresponds to an exclusiverse,
where only some possibilities are realized.
Next, in Section VI, we added an enclosing set of the-
ories, Θ. We tend to view theories and hypotheses as
mutually exclusive: one must pick one and then analyze
the resulting scenario. But that Pick introduces an OSE
because now the selection is exclusive, so one should be
careful not to promote coexisting possibilities to hypothe-
ses, such as “I am in an S cellblock”. Instead, one should
say that there are multiple physical cellblocks, and we are
in one of them with some probability for being in an S
cellblock. If we really want to have coexisting hypothe-
ses, we would need to have inclusive selection on Θ, a
“theoryverse” if you will. That is not as unreasonable
as it seems. For example, the string landscape predicts
multiple coexisting theories. Another avenue we took in
this set-of-theories analysis was to ask if we can probe
whether we live in the inclusiverse or an exclusiverse. It
is not generally possible, because it is usually impossi-
ble to disentangle other effects. We also briefly discussed
the Presumptuous Philosopher problem. It is not a prob-
lem for us because we do not make use of something
called the Self-Indication Assumption, and argue against
its use. (We noted in several places that if we use the
SIA—where a weighting factor for observers is put in
by hand instead of it arising naturally out of typicality
and keeping track of how observers are selected—then we
get the wrong answer when there is exclusive selection.
The Presumptuous Philosopher problem is an example
of this.)
Thus far, we had assumed that whatever selection was
done, was “typical”, that is, corresponding to what one
would get by random selection of a given subset of enti-
ties from a set. We relaxed that assumption, and found
that any atypical selection can be made typical by a sim-
ple redefinition of the relevant sets. This allowed us to
address the question of Boltzmann brains, which are hy-
pothetical freak observer moments which arise from very
rare fluctuations. They are a problem in a stupendously
large universe where it is possible for them to dominate
normal observers, which are confined to a small subset of
the spacetime. This is a consistency problem because we
must assume that we are not freak observers for us to ar-
gue that we have a correct understanding of the world, so
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that understanding is inconsistent if it predicts that we
are freak observers. We examined an argument by Boddy
et al. [32] that there are no self-aware freak observers be-
cause at late times the Universe will be an empty expo-
nentially expanding de Sitter space with no decoherence
to split into “many worlds.” We argued that there could
be decoherence effects from diluted matter, but an up-
per bound on the typicality of that is so small that it
counters the huge number of future freak observers such
that, by this argument, there are essentially no self-aware
freak observers. We also used the analysis of Hartle, Her-
tog, and Srednicki to demonstrate a ‘first-person proba-
bility’ effect which is somewhat orthogonal to ours—that
when models with observers are scarce, models with more
places for them to be are favored, even with exclusive se-
lection. Conversely, if all viable models allow potentially
many freak observers, those with fewer places for those
freak observers to fluctuate into existence are favored.
We then considered the analysis of J. Richard Gott
III in Section VIII, which seems to constitute a different
kind of OSE. He argued that one can bound the proba-
bility of a world lasting time T using an observer’s time
t since the start of the world; this is strange because the
selection seems to be inclusive: just the Be-selection of
the observer. One problem is that his original treatment
did not include a prior, which is essential. We showed
that one needs a fast falling (∼ 1/T 2) prior to repro-
duce his results. Then there is an effect, but it is not
an OSE, rather just an artifact of the fast-falling prior.
However, if we consider a scenario with a Pick-selection
of a unique lifetime for the world, and the prior falls with
T , then there is an OSE.
All of this prepared us to address, in Section IX, the
Doomsday question, “Do observer selection effects in-
crease the probability that our world will be short- lived?
The answer is, “Probably not.” One must first write the
question in a scale-invariant way, by which we mean that
it makes just as much sense to ask at any timescale during
the world. A question that could work is, “Will our world
last K times its present age?”, which naturally leads to
using the formalism we developed in Section VIII for the
Gott analysis. There are scenarios where it is reasonable
for the selection there to be exclusive, and it is possible
to conclude that there is a Doomsday effect, but only un-
der a set of assumptions akin to those listed at the end
of Section IX.
Several papers have argued for a Universal Doomsday
effect, which says that our data imply that worlds on av-
erage are probably more short-lived than we would have
estimated without our data. We showed that Universal
Doomsday and Doomsday are inextricably linked because
if our expectation for the fraction of short-lived worlds
changes as a result of our data, so does our expectation
for the lifetime of our world, and vice versa. So the as-
sumptions needed for a Universal Doomsday effect are
the same as those needed for a Doomsday effect.
We then applied our formalism to a somewhat different
scenario called the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Beauty is
woken once or twice during an experiment, depending on
a coin flip, and her memory of each awakening is deleted.
What probability should she assign to the coin having
come up ‘heads’? This would seem to be trivial, but has
led to philosophers dividing into two camps, ‘Halfers’,
who would assign probability 1/2, and ‘Thirders’, who
would assign probability 1/3. It turns out that they are
both right. The problem is that the question is insuffi-
ciently clearly posed and each answer is right, given a par-
ticular question. If Beauty views ‘herself’ as occupying
the three equally likely observer-moments, the inclusive
case, then she agrees with the Thirders. If, on the other
hand, she views ‘herself’ as being in one of two possible
timelines: in the one waking session of the ‘heads world’,
or the two waking sessions of the ‘tails world’, she will
agree with the Halfers. These are both reasonable ways of
interpreting who ‘she’ is. They might also be interpreted
as implying whether the world is a multiverse (in the in-
clusive case) or not (in the exclusive case), though this
is an extrapolation—all she is really doing is assuming
one or the other definition of self. Anyway, the two cases
are physically indistinguishable. For example, we showed
that both cases lead to precisely the same betting out-
comes, though Beauty arrives at the same correct odds
of winning in each case for different reasons. We also
discussed multiple trials, and the creation of observers,
which may help extend the formalism of the paper to
more general problems.
So, we have explored multiple ways in which it matters
how observers are selected. The key factor is whether the
selection is inclusive or exclusive. There can be an OSE
in the latter case but not the former, at least for the
problems we considered. Inclusive selection means that
all events considered actually occur, though you may not
experience them, such as prisoners being in an S and an
L cellblock. Exclusive selection means assigning nonzero
probabilities to some events which do not occur, such as
picking an S or L cellblock. So,
Observer Selection Effects arise from assum-
ing that there are some possibilities which are
not realized.
Among other things, to have a Doomsday effect requires
such an exclusive selection, which we wrote as, “There
is exactly one true value of the lifetime, T∗, because you
consider only one world with one fixed future.” It is thus
crucial that one carefully lays out all of one’s assump-
tions, because whether there is an OSE or not depends
upon them.
Finally, we lay out some possible future directions for
this work.
A simple direction to go in is to relax some of the as-
sumptions we made, such as ρ being constant across the
ensemble of possibilities, or that the subsets are nonover-
lapping (see Appendix A) to generalize our results.
Almost all of our analysis was classical. It would be
interesting to explore further the quantum context. One
consequence is clear: if quantum theory corresponds to
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something like the Many Worlds Interpretation, then we
are in a multiverse with inclusive selection of events. If
there is “wave-function collapse,” so that there is only one
reality, then there is an exclusive selection. But a com-
prehensive evaluation of our discussion in the quantum
context may turn up interesting results. For example,
what of quantum observers which comprise superposi-
tions of observer states?
Another avenue of inquiry is how to analyze a theory-
verse, such as the string landscape. Is it reasonable to
assume the inclusive case? In other words, should we sum
probabilities of “observers like us from different parts of
the string landscape which contain observers similar to
us despite operating with different physical laws? If so,
then it is not the probability of a given vacuum in the
landscape that matters, but that probability times its
effective number of observer moments.
Finally, while we discussed atypical observers, and the
problem of Boltzmann brains, there is perhaps more to
learn from studying what one might call freak observer-
sany observer who happens to experience freakish condi-
tions. There are many metrics for number of observers
in addressing the problem of Boltzmann brains, and it
would be useful to see if our results shed any light on
them. Also, in a multiverse there are otherwise normal
observers who happen to experience statistical fluctua-
tions of many standard deviations who draw erroneous
conclusions. How do we treat such observers, especially
with the recognition that it is not impossible in a multi-
verse that we are one of them?
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Appendix A: Notation
Consider two sets, A and B. We will write AB to mean
the compound set that consists of set B, and of set A that
is nested in B, by which we mean that every element of
A is associated with exactly one element of B. If, for
example, A is a set of nuts and B is a set of jars, then AB
is a set of jars with nuts in them. Formally, every element
Ai ∈ A has a secondary label j which corresponds to a
specific element Bj ∈ B. So Ai,j is an element of A which
is associated with (or, usually, “in”) an element Bj of B;
and A,j denotes all elements in A which correspond to
a given Bj . But we do not usually refer to labels for
individual elements. Instead we focus on subsets. Let us
define subsets Aa and Bb of sets A and B by properties
a and b, such as the subset of all nuts which are peanuts
or cashews, or the subset of large or small jars. We will
assume that these subsets are nonoverlapping and form
a complete basis, i.e.,
A =
⋃
a
Aa, Aa 6= ∅, Aa ∩Aa′ 6=a = ∅, (A1)
and the same for B and Bb (in our example above, all
the nuts are peanuts or cashews, all the jars large or
small). Further, we can define Aa,b to be the subset of
A whose elements all belong to Aa and correspond to
some element in subset Bb, e.g. all cashews in small jars,
Ac,S , are in the set of cashews Ac and are “in” a small
jar (they correspond to an element in BS). Note that
the set A is the union of all its nonoverlapping subsets:
A =
⋃
a,bAa,b. Further, the subset A,b is the union of all
subsets corresponding to label b, independent of a, i.e.,
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A,b =
⋃
aAa,b. For example, A,S is the set of all nuts
in small jars, which is the union of peanuts in small jars
(Ap,S) and cashews in small jars (Ac,S).
Let us define the number of elements of A, Aa, A,b,
and Aa,b, to be n, na, n,b and na,b, and the number
of elements of B and Bb to be N and Nb. Note that
since A is the union of nonoverlapping subsets Aa,b, we
have n =
∑
a na =
∑
b n,b =
∑
a,b na,b, and since B
is the union of the nonoverlapping subsets Bb, we have
N =
∑
bNb. We also define the number of elements in a
subset normalized by the number of elements in its next
enclosing set with an overbar:
n¯ ≡ n
N
=
∑
b
n¯,b
Nb
N
, (A2)
n¯a ≡ na
N
=
∑
b
n¯a,b
Nb
N
, (A3)
n¯,b ≡ n,b
Nb
, (A4)
n¯a,b ≡ na,b
Nb
. (A5)
(Note that all Nb 6= 0 by definition, see Eq. (A1).)
For example, n¯c,S = nc,S/NS is the average number of
cashews per small jar, which is the number of cashews in
small jars divided by the number of small jars; and n¯c
is the average number of cashews per jar, which is the
sum of the average number of cashews in each type of
jar weighted by the fraction of jars that are of that type:
n¯c =
∑L,S
J n¯c,J(NJ/N) (J is summed over S and L).
In most of the problems we consider, the leftmost set
will be P , a set of people, and the set it is nested in,
W , is a set of worlds of some kind. The main subset of
the leftmost set we will be interested in is ‘d’, those peo-
ple matching datum d. Since we will often contrast the
number of people, n, with the number of people match-
ing datum d, nd, and that is the only subset we need to
worry about, we drop the comma before nesting subset
label b, and define m:
nb ≡ n,b, m ≡ nd, mb ≡ nd,b. (A6)
We are interested in the probability of selecting an ele-
ment of some set that belongs to a subset of that set. We
will assume that the selection is random and the same for
each element, so that the probability of selection is equal
to the fraction of elements in the subset (if this is not the
case, we can always make it so by weighting the number
of elements of the subsets by some scaling factors—see
Section VII on typicality). Let us define P (Aa), to mean
“the probability that a randomly selected element of set
A belongs to subset Aa.” Note that P (A) = 1, since an
element selected from A belongs to A by definition. So
P (Aa) = P (Aa|A) because the conditional A just means
that “an element was randomly selected from A”, which
is already part of the definition of Aa. With these as-
sumptions,
P (Aa) = P (Aa|A) = na
n
=
n¯a
n¯
, P (Bb) =
Nb
N
. (A7)
Note that we can thus replace (Nb/N) in Eqs. (A2, A3)
with P (Bb). For example, if A is the set of cards in a
deck, P (Aclubs) = 1/4, and P (Aaces) = 1/13.
So long as we are selecting from one set only, there is
no ambiguity. But if we are selecting from compound set
AB with set A nested in set B, there are two possibilities:
either we first select an element of Bj of B, and then an
element Ai,j which corresponds to (is “in”) element Bj ,
which we call to Pick ; or we directly select the element
Ai, despite being nested in set B, which we define as
to Be. One has to pick a nut from a jar: select a jar
Bj and then select a nut from within the jar. But if
the elements of A are themselves observers, say prisoners
in specific cellblocks, there is another way to select: You
can be a prisoner in a cellblock without having to perform
a cellblock selection—you are just there. (It is possible
to Pick directly from set A even if it is nested in B, if
the correspondence between Ai,j and Bj is not really to
be “in” it. For example, set B could correspond to a
label, S or L, we place on each nut, and we toss them
all together and randomly select one. No jar selection
is needed to do that, yet the nesting is preserved by the
labeling. We mention this briefly in Section III with the
Warden Cafeteria Problem.)
Be probabilities are simple, just the fraction of ele-
ments in the inner set meeting the criteria:
P (AB) = P (A) =
n
n
= 1,
P (ABb) = P (A,b) =
n,b
n
=
n¯,b
n¯
P (Bb),
P (AaB) = P (Aa) =
na
n
=
n¯a
n¯
, (A8)
P (AaBb) = P (Aa,b) =
na,b
n
=
n¯a,b
n¯
P (Bb).
Pick probabilities are weighted by the selection that
first must be made on set B. We use a superscripted ver-
tical bar | to indicate a Pick from the set immediately to
its right. It is akin to a conditional within the statement,
e.g., “Aa
|Bb” means “we pick an element of type b from
set B and then from the elements of A corresponding to
that element of B we select an element of A that is in sub-
set Aa.” This is the same as saying “we picked an element
in Aa from A given that we picked an element of Bb from
B.” If there are no subset labels indicated to the left of a
Pick, then the situation is as if we are ignoring that set.
So P (A |Bb) = P (Bb) because after we pick an element
type b from B with probability P (Bb), it is certain that
the element we pick from A is from subset A (which is just
the whole set A). (We assume that there is some such ele-
ment of A, i.e., Aa,b 6= ∅.) If there are subsets specified to
the left of the Pick, such as in P (Aa
|Bb), we can write it
as a product of conditional probabilities defined below,
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P (Aa
|Bb|A |B) = P (Aa -Bb|A -Bb)P (A |Bb). Note that
we have put a slash through the Picks in the first term
of the righthand side. We will call such Picks neutered
because we are conditioning on the fact that an element
was chosen from subset Bb, and thus no action is needed
before selecting the element from A. Thus, the probabil-
ity with a neutered Pick is the same as for a Be, e.g.,
P (Aa
-Bb|A -Bb) = P (AaBb|ABb) = n¯a,b
n¯,b
. (A9)
For example, the probability of picking a small jar and
then picking a cashew given that one picked a small jar,
is the same as picking a cashew given that one picked a
small jar. So the Pick probabilities are,
P (A |B) = 1
P (A |Bb) = P (Bb),
P (Aa
|B) =
∑
b
P (Aa
|Bb) =
∑
b
n¯a,b
n¯,b
P (Bb), (A10)
P (Aa
|Bb) = P (Aa -Bb|A -Bb)P (A |Bb) = n¯a,b
n¯,b
P (Bb).
The astute reader may wonder why the selection on the
leftmost set differs from the selection of the sets to its
right. Actually, it does not, and we could put a “ |” to
the left of every leftmost set. But our notation assumes
that there is a selection on the leftmost set. So really
“ |” means a selection done on a set other than the left-
most set. (Note that one can have a set to the left of
an observer, and then one needs to insert a selection “ |”
to the left of the observers set, e.g., C |P , where C are
cards and P are observers, and although that observer is
Be-selected (i.e., just is), this is exclusive selection since
there is a selection other than on the innermost set.)
Let us explore conditional probabilities, such as the
ones we employed above, where there is one set of se-
lections given another. Here are the nontrivial possibili-
ties (keeping in mind that P (AaB|ABb) = P (AaBb|ABb)
etc):
1. P (AaB|ABb): the probability that we select an el-
ement of type a from A nested in B given that
we select an element of A that corresponds to an
element of B of type b .
2. P (ABb|AaB): the probability that we select an el-
ement of A that corresponds to an element of B of
type b given that we select an element of type a
from A nested in B.
3. P (Aa
|B|A |Bb): the probability that we select an
element of B and then select an element type a from
A which is associated with that element of B given
that we select an element of B of type b and then
select an element of A associated with that element
of B.
4. P (A |Bb|Aa |B): the probability that we select an
element of B of type b and then select an element of
A associated with that element of B given that we
select an element of B and then select an element
type a from A which is associated with that element
of B.
For example P (A |BS |Ac |B) is the probability to pick a
small jar and then pick a nut from that jar given that
we pick some jar and then pick a cashew from it. There
are actually only three nontrivial possibilities because the
first and the third are equal since the selection in the
third is neutered:
P (AaB|ABb) = P (Aa -B|A -Bb) = P (Aa,b)
P (A,b)
=
n¯a,b
n¯,b
,
P (ABb|AaB) = P (Aa,b)
P (Aa)
=
n¯a,b
n¯a
P (Bb), (A11)
P (A |Bb|Aa |B) = P (Aa
|Bb)
P (Aa |B)
=
n¯a,b
n¯,b
P (Bb)∑
b′
n¯a,b′
n¯,b′
P (Bb′)
.
In Eq. (A10) we showed that P (Aa
|Bb) is not in gen-
eral equal to P (Bb), because the selection of an element
of type a adds a nontrivial weighting factor. That is be-
cause there is an implied conditional A |B: we take it as
a given that we pick some element of B and then some
element associated with that element from the whole set
A, i.e., P (Aa
|Bb) means P (Aa |Bb|A |B). But sometimes
we want to redefine the set A we select from so that it
is some subset of qualifying elements. For example, if
our jars contain peanuts, cashews, and pebbles, but our
selection process ensures that only nuts are picked, then
we are really concerned with the subset Anut of cashews
and peanuts. To help clarify such situations, we write
redefined sets with square brackets [Are]. This new set
then has subsets [Are]a,b, and we can write the number
of elements in these as [nre] and [nre]a,b, etc. Now set
[Are] acts like A did in Eq. (A10),
P ([Are]
|B) = 1, (A12)
P ([Are]
|Bb) = P ([Are] |Bb|[Are] |B) = P (Bb),
P ([Are]a
|B) = P ([Are]a |B|[Are] |B)
=
∑
b
[n¯re]a,b
[n¯re],b
P (Bb),
P ([Are]a
|Bb) = P ([Are]a |Bb|[Are] |B)
=
[n¯re]a,b
[n¯re],b
P (Bb),
since one selects some element of [Are] with certainty.
Now, one might object that there is a lot of redundant
information in the above notation, namely the set labels
A and B. We think it is important to retain those labels
if there is any confusion about which sets are considered,
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which subset labels correspond to which set, and which
sets have a Pick on them—an issue if there are more than
two nested sets. But if there are only two nested sets
which are the same throughout some calculation, and the
subscript labels are unique to a set, we can use a compact
notation by omitting the set names while preserving the
order of any subscript labels and selection bars:
P (αβ) ≡ P (AαBβ), P (α |β) ≡ P (Aα |Bβ), (A13)
where α and β can be ‘null,’ e.g., P (b|a) ≡ P (ABb|AaB)
and P ( |b|a |) ≡ P (A |Bb|Aa |B). For example, in com-
pact notation, using Eq. (A8-A10),
P (b) ≡ P (ABb) = n¯,b
n¯
P (Bb) =
n¯,b
n¯
P ( |b), (A14)
and Bayes’ Law with a Pick is,
P ( |b|a |) = P (a
|| |b)P ( |b)
P (a |)
. (A15)
We use the more verbose notation in most of the main
text for clarity. Here are the terse versions: The posterior
probability for a Be, Eq. (6), becomes
P (S|d) = P (d|S)P (S)
P (d)
= P ( |S), (A16)
the posterior probability for a Pick Eq. (10) becomes
P ( |S|d |) = P (d
-| -S)P ( |S)
P (d |)
=
P ( |S)
P ( |S) + 1ρP (
|L)
. (A17)
We can use the compact formalism for three or more
nested sets, but there is an ambiguity about a Pick. Does
P ( |c) mean P (A |BCc) or P (AB |Cc)? We advise not
using the compact notation with three or more sets unless
any Pick is always on one of them. For our examples
using nested person-world-ensemble PWE, any Pick is
always on E, and so we can use compact notation,
P (d |) ≡ P (PdW |E),
P (S |) ≡ P (PWS |E), (A18)
P ( |y) ≡ P (PW |Ey).
